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Forced Medical Treatment of Pregnant
Women: "Compelling Each to Live as
Seems Good to the Rest"t
By LAWRENCE J. NELSON,*
BRIAN P. BUGGY,**
and CAROL J. WEIL***
For reasons ranging from fear of surgery to religious belief, compe-
tent pregnant women sometimes refuse medical treatment that a physi-
cian considers beneficial to the woman, the fetus, or both.I If the woman
intends to bring the fetus to term, the attending physician and other
health care practitioners involved in the woman's care may find her re-
fusal odd and inconsistent with the desire to deliver a healthy baby.
t "Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to
themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest." Mill, On Liberty, in 43
GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 271 (R. Hutchins ed. 1952).
* Associate, Hanson, Bridgett, Marcus, Vlahos & Rudy, San Francisco, Cal.; Adjunct
Lecturer, Division of Medical Ethics, Department of Medicine, University of California, San
Francisco. A.B., 1974, Ph.D., 1978, St. Louis University; J.D., 1981, Yale School of Law.
** Assistant Professor of Medicine, Medical College of Wisconsin. B.S., 1973, Boston
College; M.D., 1977, Medical College of Wisconsin.
*** Research Associate, Department of Public Policy, American College of Physicians.
B.A., 1981, Pomona College; J.D., 1984, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California,
Berkeley.
1. In this context, "competent" has the meaning it usually has in cases involving adults
refusing medical treatment, i.e., demonstrating an ability to understand the nature of one's
medical condition and the consequences of refusing treatment. See Bartling v. Superior Court,
163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 193, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 223-24 (1984) (patient knew removal of ventila-
tor would result in death); Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 384, 376 N.E.2d 1232,
1236 (1978) (patient rejected amputation with full appreciation of the consequences); State
Dep't of Human Servs. v. Northern, 563 S.W.2d 197, 209-10 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978) (though
lucid generally, patient lacked comprehension of seriousness of her medical condition).
The analysis presented in this Article assumes that the mother is legally competent. An
incompetent pregnant woman should be given medically indicated treatment to prevent harm
to herself and to her fetus despite her apparent objection. As with other incompetent adults,
medical practitioners should not permit incompetent pregnant women to be harmed by refus-
ing treatment that likely will benefit them. If the attending medical practitioners doubt the
competency of a pregnant woman who is refusing treatment, they should immediately seek the
advice of mental health professionals, an institutional ethics committee, and legal counsel. On
occasion, a woman's competency may be so doubtful that it is reasonable for the practitioners
involved to seek judicial guidance.
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Moreover, if the treatment poses a relatively insignificant direct medical
risk to the mother, while promising to be of significant benefit to the
fetus, her refusal may seem even more puzzling.2 When a pregnant wo-
man refuses treatment that will either directly or indirectly benefit her
fetus, and perhaps even save its life, she confronts her physician and
other involved practitioners with a dilemma rooted in conflicting loyal-
ties to the woman and to the fetus. Do they honor the mother's refusal
and leave the fetus to a possible fate of injury, disability, or death, or do
they ignore the mother's wishes and treat her, despite her objections, for
the sake of protecting the fetus?
If the physician chooses to treat the mother despite her refusal, he
must not only ethically justify ignoring the woman's right to control her
own body, but also must face the potential legal consequences of treating
her against her will. On the other hand, if the physician respects her
refusal, he seemingly has abandoned the fetus, arguably a patient sepa-
rate from the mother to whom he owes an ethical and legal duty of care.
To escape this dilemma, some physicians and hospitals have sought and
obtained judicial orders compelling pregnant women to undergo the
medically recommended treatment despite their previous refusal.3 Seek-
ing judicial sanction for compelled treatment transfers the problem from
the hospital to the courthouse, from the physician to the judge, but the
same difficult question remains: should the pregnant woman be forced to
accept medical treatment that she does not want?
This Article attempts to answer the formidable and serious question:
when, if ever, is it ethically and legally permissible for a physician or a
judge to compel a competent pregnant woman to undergo medical treat-
ment for the sake of her fetus? 4 Although the question arises rarely, 5
2. This Article sometimes refers to pregnant women as "mothers" and commonly refers
to the unborn product of human conception as a "fetus" rather than an "unborn child" or an
"unborn baby." The Article does not attempt to invoke any particular emotion or image by
use of these terms but rather seeks to achieve verbal economy. The authors recognize the
human status of the fetus and its obvious potential to develop into what we all recognize to be
a person with full human rights. However, one does not have to deny the fetus all moral status
or legal protection whatsoever in order to conclude that a competent pregnant woman's refusal
of medical treatment should be respected, even if harm will then befall her fetus. The reasons
supporting this conclusion are set forth in detail infra text accompanying notes 217-88.
3. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 87-89, 274
S.E.2d 457, 459-60 (1981).
4. For other articles on this issue, see, e.g., Annas, Forced Cesareans: The Most Un-
kindest Cut ofAll, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1982, at 16; Myers, Abuse and Neglect of the
Unborn: Can the State Intervene?, 23 DUQ. L. REV. 1 (1984).
5. There is no reliable method to estimate how often pregnant women refuse medical
treatment that would benefit their fetuses, but the cases cited herein and the authors' profes-
sional experience indicate that it happens often enough to be a significant ethical and legal
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when it does, it generates heated controversy and bitter conflict. This
Article begins by discussing the various clinical situations in which ma-
ternal-fetal conflict may arise and the perceptions of clinicians faced with
a maternal refusal of treatment. The Article then explores the ethical
aspects of compelling a pregnant woman to undergo treatment for the
benefit of her fetus. The Article next considers the legal status of the
fetus and the legal interests of the pregnant woman. Finally, the Article
discusses the problem of legally compelling pregnant women to live as
seems good to their physicians, to the judiciary, or to society generally.6
Some legal commentators favor pervasive judicial intervention in the life
of a pregnant woman who refuses treatment,7 others favor only limited
intervention," and some favor no intervention at all.9 This Article argues
that neither the medical profession nor the judiciary should force compe-
tent pregnant women to undergo medical treatment for the sake of pre-
serving the life or health of their fetuses, regardless of the result. This
conclusion ultimately rests not only on a view of the legal status of the
fetus and the woman's constitutional right of privacy, largely ignored by
other commentators, but also on a conviction that it is profoundly un-
wise social policy for the law to use its coercive power to invade a per-
problem. It is probably far more common, however, for pregnant women to engage in some
sort of behavior that potentially could be harmful to the fetus, such as smoking, consuming
alcohol, and using drugs like heroin and cocaine, than it is for them to refuse medical
treatment.
6. See In re Caulk, 125 N.H. 226, 236-37, 480 A.2d 93, 100 (1984) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Mill, On Liberty, in 43 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 271 (R. Hutch-
ins ed. 1952)).
7. See, e.g., Robertson, The Right to Procreate and In Utero Fetal Therapy, 3 J. LEGAL
MED. 333, 351-61 (1982) (Once the fetus is past the point of viability, the mother has a duty to
produce a live and healthy infant.).
8. See, e.g., Mathieu, Respecting Liberty and Preventing Harm: Limits of State Interven-
tion in Prenatal Choice, 8 HARV. J. LAW & PUB. POL'Y 19, 51-52 (1985) (advocates a balanc-
ing test in which relative weight of conflicting interests changes according to point in
pregnancy at which they arise); Myers, supra note 4, at 65-71 (would erect a "presumption
against intervention" and would require state to use "least restrictive means" when interven-
tion necessary); Note, The Fetal Patient and the Unwilling Mother: A Standard for Judicial
Intervention, 14 PAc. L.J. 1065 (1983) (proposing that a mother's choice regarding medical
treatment of her fetus prevails unless the fetal therapy is a proven procedure that clearly would
benefit the fetus, the use of such therapy would prevent significant and irreversible physical or
mental impairment of the fetus, no less intrusive treatment is available, and the treatment will
not result in serious harm to the mother); Note, Constitutional Limitations on State Interven-
tion in Prenatal Care, 67 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1066-67 (1981) (asserting that state action regulat-
ing a pregnant woman's behavior would be constitutional if it prevented serious harm to the
fetus' health, if no less intrusive means would achieve the same end, and if the woman were
provided procedural protections when the state proposed to invade her bodily integrity).
9. See, e.g., Annas, supra note 4, at 16 (arguing that a pregnant woman has "a right to
refuse surgery recommended for the sake of her fetus").
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son's body even for the benefit of what is arguably another person. This
Article also argues that pregnant women should not be forced to alter
their behavior in order to reduce or eliminate risk to their fetuses.
Maternal-Fetal Conflicts in the Clinical Context
An evaluation of whether a mother should be forced to accept treat-
ment requires a general understanding of the clinical situations during
pregnancy in which the interests of the mother and her fetus may con-
flict. Obviously, both the fetus and the mother face the medical risks of
pregnancy itself. In addition, the fetus may suffer from various medical
conditions that are amenable to direct therapy in utero. Moreover, a va-
riety of maternal behaviors may adversely affect fetal health. If a mother
takes physical risks during pregnancy or refuses medical treatment for
herself or the fetus, a physician faces the dilemma of having two patients
with competing interests. This section discusses the medical risks of
pregnancy and examines those situations in which certain maternal be-
havior or maternal refusal of medical treatment may cause harm to the
fetus.
Inherent Medical Risks of Pregnancy
The outcome for the mother in a normal spontaneous vaginal deliv-
ery is uniformly excellent. Postpartum morbidity-pain, discomfort, and
disfigurement-is slight, and mortality from the normal birth process it-
self is exceedingly unusual.' 0 Delivery by Cesarean section, a surgical
procedure opening the maternal abdomen and uterus to deliver the fetus,
has more morbidity than does routine vaginal delivery, but the morbidity
is similar to that from other abdominal operations and consists primarily
of pain and discomfort related to the incision. Still, maternal mortality
after Cesarean section is extremely low, less than one per thousand, and
usually is due to blood clots, infections, or the complications of
anesthesia. "
Similarly, a normal vaginal delivery poses little risk to the fetus.
Cesarean section by itself also poses a very small chance of harm to the
fetus. Indeed, it is often performed to secure a rapid and controlled de-
livery in order to improve fetal outcome. For example, Cesarean section
is indicated in most cases of placenta previa, a condition in which the
placenta grows over the opening to the birth canal. If a vaginal delivery
10. J. PRITCHARD, P. MACDONALD & N. GANT, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 3 (17th ed.
1985) [hereinafter cited as WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS].
11. Id. at 868-69.
[Vol. 37
is attempted past a placenta previa, profuse bleeding through the vagina
can occur. In this situation, although both mother and fetus risk death
from hemorrhage, the fetal risk is higher because the fetus is completely
dependent for survival on the blood supply from the placenta. When the
previa is complete, causing total blockage of the birth canal by the pla-
centa, maternal as well as fetal survival may depend upon prompt control
of the bleeding by removing the placenta through Cesarean section or, on
occasion, hysterectomy. 12
The case of Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority 13
highlights this problem, and illustrates the limited ability of a physician
to predict the outcome of pregnancy. Mrs. Jefferson's obstetrician testi-
fied that she had a complete placenta previa and that, if a vaginal deliv-
ery were attempted, her infant had a ninety-nine percent chance of dying
and she a fifty percent chance of dying. The court ordered Mrs. Jefferson
to undergo an ultrasound examination, and if a complete placenta previa
was still present, then to undergo Cesarean section. She refused to un-
dergo Cesarean section on religious grounds, but did appear for the or-
dered ultrasound examination. A few days later, she uneventfully
delivered a healthy child without surgical intervention. 14
Cesarean section is also medically indicated for abruptio
placentae.' 5 In this condition, the placenta detaches prematurely from
the inner wall of the uterus, and the fetal blood supply can be quickly
and severely impaired. Placental abruption poses somewhat less risk to
the mother than does placenta previa because the bleeding is contained
within the uterus and usually stops spontaneously. If spontaneous deliv-
ery of the fetus and placenta does not occur, however, Cesarean section is
necessary not only to prevent further blood loss and clotting problems in
the mother, both of which can be fatal, but also to secure live birth. 16
12. The perinatal mortality (death of the fetus shortly before, after, or during the birth
process) rate for all cases of placenta previa is approximately 10%. Without Cesarean section,
the fetal risk of death is much higher, but accurate data are not available. With modem obstet-
ric care, maternal mortality is very low. See Hibbard, Placenta Previa, in 2 GYNECOLOGY &
OBSTETRICS ch. 49 (1985). Obviously, if a woman refused either Cesarean section or other
therapy designed to stop the bleeding, her risk of dying would be higher.
13. 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981).
14. Annas, supra note 4, at 16.
15. WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 10, at 402-03.
16. The perinatal mortality from abruptio placentae in the best of circumstances is from
30% to 60%. Without prompt Cesarean section, fetal death is almost certain. There are well-
documented cases in which a fetus, alive at the time of admission to the hospital when abrup-
tion had already begun, died in utero while waiting for a vaginal delivery to occur. Maternal
mortality is approximately 1% with prompt Cesarean section. Ifabruption is allowed to con-
tinue, however, the bleeding within the uterus can cause low blood pressure, clotting problems,
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Cesarean section is also appropriate for the controlled delivery of
extremely premature infants when fetal distress 17 occurs during prema-
ture labor.' 8 Premature labor may occur when a fetus is at a very low
weight (less than 750 grams) and at a gestational age that is on the bor-
der of viability outside the uterus (twenty-four to twenty-seven weeks).
Less than one percent of all live births occur in this gestational age
group. However, when premature labor cannot be stopped and fetal
heart monitoring indicates fetal distress, then Cesarean section offers the
best chance of delivering the fetus alive. 19 A premature fetus has a
higher chance of injury during labor and delivery than does a fetus deliv-
ered at term.20
When labor has failed to progress, or when the fetus has physical
dimensions prohibiting passage through the pelvis, Cesarean section is
the preferred treatment.2 ' Delivery by Cesarean section is also indicated
when the progress of labor has been unsatisfactory and there is evidence
of fetal distress. Vaginal delivery in these situations will result in higher
fetal and maternal morbidity and mortality than will delivery by
Cesarean section.
Interruption of pregnancy either by induction of labor or by
Cesarean section may be medically indicated in cases of eclampsia, a syn-
drome in which maternal high blood pressure and seizures injure both
mother and fetus because of insufficient oxygen delivery to vital organs.
Prompt cessation of labor by either vaginal delivery or Cesarean section
greatly reduces both fetal and maternal morbidity and mortality.22
and kidney damage in the mother. See generally id. at 396-97; Weinbaum, Preucel & Gebbe,
Placental Abruption, in 2 GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS, supra note 12, ch. 50.
17. Fetal distress is a term describing any situation during which the fetus receives insuf-
ficient blood supply from the placenta, and thus insufficient oxygen, and suffers some organ
compromise as a result. This compromise is at the cellular level and results in an excess of acid
in the fetus' system. If the stress is severe, abnormal patterns can be seen with fetal heart rate
monitoring. WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 10, at 286-91, 867. See the discussion of fetal
heart monitoring infra note 38.
18. Dillon & Egan, Aggressive Obstetric Management in Late Second- Trimester Deliveries,
58 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 685 (1981).
19. WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 10, at 756-57.
20. Id.
21. Difficult labor, known as dystocia, can occur in several situations: 1) when the uterus
is unable to contract in a forceful and coordinated manner sufficient to deliver the fetus; 2)
when the fetus has a congenital anomaly, such as a large head from hydrocephalus, or lies
within the uterus so that a shoulder would descend the birth canal first rather than the head
(transverse lie); and 3) when pelvic abnormalities in the mother prevent passage of the fetus
down the birth canal. In any of these situations, vaginal delivery probably would be unsuc-
cessful and cause fetal death. See WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 10, at 641-42, 657, 662-
65.
22. Eclampsia is the most severe of several syndromes involving high blood pressure that
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37
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In situations of repeated third trimester miscarriage due to weakness
of the cervix, the physician may recommend cerclage (suturing to close
the cervix) in order to maintain the pregnancy. This procedure has no
risk to the fetus and virtually none to the mother.23
A deterioration in general maternal health may pose some risk to
the fetus. For example, in one case, physicians sought a court order re-
quiring a pregnant woman to receive blood transfusions because they
feared she would suffer severe hemorrhaging prior to the end of her preg-
nancy.24 The mother had refused the blood transfusions for religious
reasons. The court directed her to receive blood transfusions if medically
necessary to save her life or the life of the fetus.25 While such transfu-
sions pose very little risk to either the mother or the fetus, they rarely are
medically indicated.
Medical Conditions Amenable to In Utero Therapy
In recent years, several congenital conditions of the fetus have be-
come subject to in utero diagnosis and treatment. Physicians can diag-
nose these conditions either by ultrasound 26 or by amniocentesis. 27 Some
conditions require that drugs be administered to the mother in order to
may occur during pregnancy. Elevated blood pressure commonly occurs in pregnancy because
of an increased volume of blood circulating in the mother. When the mother develops severe
leg swelling, protein in the urine, and high blood pressure, pre-eclampsia is said to exist. Many
treatment regimens, primarily drugs, are available to control pre-eclampsia and prevent the
full syndrome of eclampsia.
Pre-eclampsia occurs in approximately five percent of all pregnancies, but eclampsia oc-
curs in only one to two percent. With proper treatment of pre-eclampsia and prompt delivery
in cases of eclampsia, fetal and maternal mortality is very low. Although no accurate data are
available, such mortality obviously would be higher for both the mother and her fetus if she
refused therapy for these conditions. See generally WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 10, at
544-54; Sibai, Preeclampsia-Eclampsia, in 2 GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS, supra note 12, ch.
51.
23. In one case, a husband unsuccessfully sought a court order to require his pregnant
wife to undergo this procedure after she refused it on religious grounds. Taft v. Taft, 388
Mass. 331, 446 N.E.2d 395 (1983).
24. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d
537 (per curiam), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
25. Id. at 424, 201 A.2d at 538.
26. Ultrasonography involves the transmission of radio waves into the body. These
waves are reflected off body tissues and fluids and are detected by a transducer to create an
image. There are no known risks or side effects from this purely diagnostic technique.
27. Amniocentesis involves the insertion of a needle into the uterus with ultrasound gui-
dance to sample the amniotic fluid surrounding the growing fetus. Cells obtained from the
fluid are cultured and analyzed for evidence of chromosomal abnormalities, such as Down's
syndrome. The procedure is very safe, with rare reports of premature labor, infection, and
maternal or fetal bleeding. WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 10, at 268-69.
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treat the fetus. 28 Other examples involve direct intra-amniotic instilla-
tion of a drug 29 or even blood transfusions into the peritoneal cavity of
the fetus to treat a certain often fatal form of anemia called erythroblas-
tosis fetalis. Intra-amniotic injections pose little risk to either fetus or
mother. Direct fetal blood transfusions pose some risk of harm to the
fetus, as the transfusion needle actually enters the fetal abdomen. 30
Other conditions may require early delivery, often by Cesarean sec-
tion, in order to achieve the best possible fetal outcome. For example,
congenital hydronephrosis (blocked urine flow leading to progressive kid-
ney dysfunction) and hydrocephalus (blockage of the flow of cerebro-
spinal fluid preventing normal brain development) would require surgical
intervention and delivery much earlier than the normal end of pregnancy
in order to protect normal fetal development. If the surgery involved
only placement of a catheter through the mother's abdominal wall into
the fetal bladder, this would pose little risk to the mother. Hysterotomy
(actually opening the uterus to operate on the fetus), on the other hand,
poses the same risk as a Cesarean section. If the fetus had congenital
hydronephrosis, for example, and the mother refused any intervention,
then at birth the infant would suffer complete kidney failure and would
require kidney dialysis, which is difficult to perform in newborns. If con-
genital hydrocephalus were not corrected, fetal neurological handicaps,
including mental retardation, would result. 3'
Actual surgery on the fetus while in utero is still experimental, but
researchers are accumulating experience with certain techniques. 32 As
28. For example, to help maturation of the fetal lung, a physician may administer gluco-
corticoids to the mother.
29. One such drug would be thyroid hormone, used to treat congenital hypothyroidism.
30. Erythroblastosis fetalis is an often fatal form of hemolytic anemia in the fetus or
neonate that is caused by the transplacental transmission of maternal antibodies that destroy
the fetal red blood cells. It is caused by blood group incompatibility between the mother and
fetus. In the fetus or newborn, this condition causes jaundice, enlargement of the liver and
spleen, and anemia. If the anemia is severe enough, circulatory failure ensues, and the fetus or
newborn dies. If the fetus dies in utero, this most severe form of anemia is called hydrops
fetalis.
Direct fetal blood transfusions are performed only during the 23rd to 32nd weeks of gesta-
tion. About 50% of such transfusion attempts are successful. Attempts earlier in pregnancy
are either unsuccessful or cause fetal injury because the fetus is so small. After the 30th week,
delivery by Cesarean section with ex utero blood exchanges is technically much more success-
ful. At this age, the infant can be more easily kept alive outside the uterus. If the anemia is
severe enough to require either attempts at fetal blood transfusion or early delivery, and such
therapy is refused by the mother, the fetus will almost certainly die. WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS,
supra note 10, at 776-79.
31. See Harrison, Golbus & Filly, Management of the Fetus with a Correctable Congenital
Defect, 246 J. A.M.A. 774, 776 (1981).
32. As of May 15, 1985, 72 cases of obstructive uropathy (blockage of the normal flow of
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more true surgical interventions on the fetus occur, the risk of fetal dam-
age from the operative procedure itself and the chance of premature de-
livery may increase. The risks from direct fetal surgery are uniformly
higher for the fetus than for the mother. No matter how small the risks
to the mother, however, they may seem particularly significant in this
unique situation because the mother receives no personal medical benefit
from the intervention.
If a procedure requires hysterotomy, the mother faces a slight risk of
harm from the surgical procedure itself, as well as a high risk of prema-
ture labor. If a premature delivery occurs, the life and health of the fetus
would be at risk because its chances to survive and thrive increase with
the time spent developing in utero. Although drug therapy exists to fore-
stall premature delivery, it is neither totally effective nor completely safe
for either the mother or the fetus.33
Medical Risks of Maternal Behavior to the Fetus
Maternal behavior and life-style can also directly affect fetal devel-
opment. Adequate maternal nutrition is considered essential for fetal
growth. Cigarette smoking slows fetal development and leads to smaller
than normal infants. These infants have a higher death rate after birth
than do infants born of nonsmoking mothers.34 Mothers whose diabetes
mellitus is not well-controlled risk eclampsia and infection, and are more
likely to give birth to large babies with an increased perinatal mortality. 35
urine from the bladder into the amniotic fluid) in fetuses had been treated with placement of an
in utero chronic vesico-amniotic shunt (a catheter placed into the fetal bladder to drain urine
into the amniotic fluid). The best survival rate (80%) was seen in those cases with a posterior
urethral valve as the only anomaly. Most other cases had other malformations as well, with an
overall group survival of 42%. The procedural death rate was 4%, two deaths occurring after
trauma from the procedure and one from premature delivery induced by infection from the
procedure. Of those surviving, 93% had no long-term morbidity.
Thirty-two ventriculo-amniotic shunts were placed for obstructive hydrocephalus (block-
age of the normal flow of cerebrospinal fluid around the brain and spinal cord) and 27 survived
(85%). Four deaths (12.5%) were directly related to the procedure. Eleven infants (41% of
those surving) were normal at a mean follow-up period of eight months, the others exhibiting
mild to severe neurologic handicaps. Manning, International Fetal Surgery Report (1985) (un-
published report on file with THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL); see also Harrison, Filly &
Golbus, Fetal Treatment 1982, 307 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1651 (1982).
33. Drug therapy involves the use of tocolytic (from the Greek word "tokos," meaning
childbirth) agents that slow and abolish premature uterine contractions. Ritodrine is the most
effective such drug currently approved, but its side effects to the mother, and presumably the
fetus, are potentially serious. These side effects include fever, decreased blood pressure, de-
creased serum potassium, acidosis, and cardiac failure. See WILLIAMS OBSTRETRICS, supra
note 10, at 752-53.
34. Id. at 258.
35. Id. at 600-01.
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Maternal heroin use can result in fetal addiction. Narcotic withdrawal
can be both prolonged and dangerous in an infant. 36 Fetal alcohol syn-
drome may result from maternal alcoholism. Infants with this syndrome
suffer from prenatal and postnatal growth retardation, mental retarda-
tion, and a constellation of cardiovascular, craniofacial, and limb defor-
mities. Moreover, they face an increased chance of dying after birth.37
Dilemma of Medical Treatment
Physicians understandably may be perplexed when a mother refuses
a recommended therapy that poses some risk to her, but is intended to
improve fetal survival. One report describes what one group of physi-
cians thought to be the irrational refusal of a woman in labor to allow
Cesarean section recommended because of fetal distress. 38 The physi-
36. Id. at 788-89.
37. Clarren, Recognition of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, 245 J. A.M.A. 2436, 2436 (1981).
38. Bowes & Selgestad, Fetal Versus Maternal Rights: MIedical and Legal Perspectives, 58
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 209, 209-11 (1981). In this case, Cesarean section occurred
some eight hours after the fetal heart monitor disclosed patterns consistent with fetal distress
and after the mother initially refused to consent to surgery. The infant was severely stressed at
birth but then recovered uneventfully. After the severe lack of oxygen endured by the fetus
during the long labor, concern would be appropriate for the child's future intellectual develop-
ment. Here, the fetal heart monitor accurately predicted significant fetal distress. Meconium,
the first expelled fecal material of the fetus, had also stained the amniotic fluid three hours
after the first abnormal fetal heart tracings, another reliable sign of fetal distress.
Contraction stress tests are performed near term in order to predict fetal well-being if the
pregnancy is allowed to continue. The mother is brought to the hospital near term and oxyto-
cin is administered to stimulate uterine contractions. Fetal heart rate monitoring is employed.
If fetal distress patterns appear, then early termination of pregnancy by Cesarean section is
considered. Such testing is occasionally performed when the mother has diabetes, hyperten-
sion, or is past her due date. These tests have an acceptable false-negative rate (0.5-1.0%), but
a high false-positive rate. See Jarrell & Sokol, Clinical Use of Stressed and Nonstressed Moni-
toring Techniques, in 2 GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS, supra note 12, ch. 58.
Fetal heart rate monitoring is used more commonly during labor itself. Such continuous
intrapartum fetal heart rate monitoring is standard in many delivery suites, especially when
labor has not progressed satisfactorily. Although both external (ultrasound or phonocardi-
ography) or internal (attaching an electrode directly to the fetus) systems can be used, the
latter is more reliable technically. Various patterns of fetal heart rate decelerations are used to
predict potential danger to the fetus if labor is allowed to continue. See D'Angelo & Sokol,
Intrapartum Fetal Monitoring, in 2 GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS, supra note 12, ch. 59. No
accurate data exist on the predictive accuracy of these tests, and notable exceptions to the
predicted outcomes have occurred. One study showed a reduction in both the intrapartum
and neonatal death rates when monitoring was applied. This was observed in both high-risk
and low-risk pregnancies. See Erkkola, Gruonroos, Punnonen & Kilkku, Analysis of Intrapar-
tum Fetal Deaths: Their Decline With Increasing Electronic Fetal Monitoring, 63 ACTA OB-
STETRICIA ET GYNECOLOGICA SCANDINAVICA 459, 459-61 (1984). In spite of its limitations,
fetal heart monitoring may be considered the appropriate standard of care, at least in high-risk
pregnancies. See Schifrin, Weissman & Wiley, Electronic Fetal Monitoring and Obstetrical
Malpractice, 13 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 100 (1985).
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cians hurriedly summoned attorneys and a juvenile court judge to the
delivery room, where the judge ordered a Cesarean section over the
mother's objections. The mother then became more cooperative, and the
doctors ultimately achieved a successful delivery by Cesarean section.
One recent medical journal reported a more dramatic confrontation
between a mother and her physician.39 In that case, abruptio placentae
suddenly occurred during labor and presented an imminent threat to fe-
tal survival. The attending physicians felt that immediate action was
necessary to save the fetus and that no time could be lost in attempting to
secure legal sanction for their plan. Despite the mother's repeated refus-
als to give consent for a Cesarean section, she did not actively resist when
given general anesthesia. The physicians then delivered a severely
stressed, but otherwise healthy infant by Cesarean section.
These cases outline the dimensions of the direct conflict that can
occur upon the mother's choice to subordinate her fetus' interests to
other values, values which often appear to the physician as a lack of con-
cern for fetal well-being and as antagonistic to the physician's goal of
providing the fetus with the maximum chance for survival and a normal
life. The physician's dilemma is even sharper when the infant is other-
wise normal and at term, as in the two examples described above. Physi-
cians who treat pregnant women may reasonably assume that the mother
views the interests of the fetus as at least equal to, if not more important
than, her own.
Physicians generally assume that if the woman becomes pregnant
and then carries the pregnancy toward term, she wants to deliver a
healthy infant. Physicians may have a low tolerance for many patients'
often unstated fears concerning minor medical problems or low-risk in-
vasive procedures, such as Cesarean section. When an apparently com-
petent mother decides on a course of action that clearly places her
infant's life at risk, the confusion and possible anger of those who other-
wise would do everything possible to save that infant is understandable.
Those emotions, however, should not determine the response of physi-
cians, or of the law, to maternal refusals of treatment.
In summary, a pregnant woman can refuse medical treatment in a
variety of situations. Each case poses different risks and consequences
for mother and fetus. Likewise, the reasons a pregnant woman might
refuse treatment could vary greatly and may well have nothing to do
with the relative medical risks of the treatment recommended by a physi-
39. Jurow & Paul, Cesarean Delivery for Fetal Distress Without Maternal Consent, 63
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 596, 596-97 (1984).
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cian. In fact, the reported cases suggest that the most common reason
for refusal of treatment by pregnant women is religious belief.40 Simi-
larly, a pregnant woman can adopt a number of different life-styles or
behaviors that pose some risk of harm to her fetus. Whatever the reasons
for refusal and whatever the attendant medical risks, the question of
whether a pregnant woman should be forced to undergo medical treat-
ment against her will or to behave in ways she does not freely choose
cannot be answered solely on the basis of whether the mother or fetus
may suffer some physical detriment. The fundamental ethical, legal, and
social values at stake must be taken into account as well. On balance,
these values do not justify compelling a pregnant woman to accept medi-
cal treatment against her will. 4'
Ethics and Maternal-Fetal Conflict
Moral Status of the Fetus
Resolution of the moral conflict between a woman and the fetus she
carries logically begins with an articulation of the moral status of the
fetus. The debate concerning the moral status of the fetus has generally
focused upon the question of whether it is a "person." For, if the fetus is
a person, then it is a being inherently worthy of respect and has rights
which morally obligate all other persons to treat it with dignity and with
consideration for its interests. Correspondingly, if the fetus is a person, it
has a right to continue to exist, a "right to life." Consequently, others
would be morally obligated to refrain from actions that would deprive
the fetus of its life, injure its health, or unjustifiably interfere with its
development. In addition, they would be obligated, at least to some ex-
tent, to take actions that would benefit the fetus and enhance its pros-
pects for life.
The determination of whether the fetus is a person is not made by
scientific observation of facts. Rather, it is a philosophical matter involv-
ing arguments about moral values and moral principles that vary in their
persuasiveness. A somewhat bewildering variety of arguments has been
made about the moral values and principles that should guide an assess-
ment of the moral status of the fetus and our consequent treatment of it.
To complicate matters further, each of these arguments has profound
40. E.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 86, 274 S.E.2d
457, 458 (1981); Taft v. Taft, 388 Mass. 331, 333, 446 N.E.2d 395, 396 (1983); Raleigh Fitkin-
Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 422, 201 A.2d 537, 538 (per curiam),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
41. See infra notes 217-88 & accompanying text.
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implications for personal action and public policy. As a result, the moral
status of the fetus is controversial and unsettled.
Many commentators have noted the ethical importance of identify-
ing a point at which a person comes into being and becomes a bearer of
rights and duties.42 Some believe that from the moment a human ovum
is fertilized with human sperm, a separate person exists who possesses
the same ethical rights and is owed the same treatment as any live-born
man or woman.43 Others contend that the fetus is, at most, a potential
person, lacking full ethical status until it is born alive and lives indepen-
dently outside the mother's body.44 According to this view, the fetus
need not be treated as if it were a person, although it is not necessarily a
being without any moral status whatsoever. 45 Still others have asserted
that the fetus becomes a person at the moment of its first heartbeat, when
it starts to kick in the womb or is "quick,"'46 or when it reaches the point
of viability and is able to maintain its life outside the womb.4 7
In short, there is no consensus about when the fetus becomes a per-
son and when we must treat it accordingly. The multiplicity of views
about the fetus' moral status is as disquieting as it is puzzling, perhaps
because each view has but part of the truth. It is reasonable to claim that
a fetus has human moral value and significance: it possesses the potential
to develop into what is unarguably a human person, it develops markedly
human physical characteristics at an early stage in its growth, and it is
genetically and organically distinct from its mother. Yet, it is also rea-
sonable to claim that this potential is not equivalent to the actual, that
the recently fertilized egg is simply not the same kind of moral being as a
live-born human, and that the death of a fertilized egg in the course of
attempting in vitro fertilization 48 is hardly the moral equivalent of mur-
42. See, e.g., Englehardt, Viability and the Use of the Fetus, in ABORTION AND THE STA-
TUS OF THE FETUS 189, 189-91 (W. Bondeson, H. Engelhardt, Jr., S. Spicker & D. Winship
eds. 1983).
43. See, e.g., THE MORALITY OF ABORTION xvii (J. Noonan ed. 1970).
44. See, e.g., Fletcher, Fetal Research: An Ethical Appraisal, in THE NATIONAL COM-
MISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, RESEARCH ON THE FETUS 3, 3 (1975).
45. While conceding that the fetus is not a person, one reasonably could maintain that
the fetus' potential personhood is sufficient to prohibit others from engaging in fetal experi-
mentation that would cause it pain. Similarly, one could reasonably maintain that, although it
is not necessarily immoral for a woman to choose an abortion, such a choice remains a very
serious moral matter.
46. For a definition of "quick," see infra note 123.
47. See J. FLETCHER, THE ETHICS OF GENETIC CONTROL 139 (1979).
48. In vitro fertilization is a process in which ova are harvested from a woman at the time
in the menstrual cycle when they can be fertilized by donor sperm, either from the husband or
another donor. The actual fertilization occurs in the laboratory (in vitro) and not in the wo-
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der. Those who adhere to this view believe that, at least until the fetus
can or actually does live outside of the womb, the mother should have
the prerogative to terminate her pregnancy for good reason.
Given the wide variety of sincerely held and plausible moral argu-
ments about the status of the fetus, it seems pointless to rest resolution of
conflicting maternal-fetal medical treatment interests upon the somewhat
abstract issue of the fetus' moral status. Instead, an ethical analysis of
the particular context of obstetric medical treatment may be more help-
ful in illuminating maternal-fetal conflict.
Moral Dilemma of the Medical Practitioner
In the case of a wanted pregnancy, the identity of interest between
the mother and the fetus rarely presents the physician providing prenatal
care with ethical obligations to the fetus that are distinct from those to
the mother. A woman who intends to bring her pregnancy to term typi-
cally wants what is best for her fetus and seeks and accepts medical treat-
ment accordingly. The physician's job is to ascertain which treatments
are medically necessary to produce both a healthy infant and mother.
For all practical purposes, then, the physician encounters but one patient
who is the subject of medical treatment.
When caring for a woman who wants to bring her fetus to term, the
physician is morally obligated to render the best possible care to achieve
the mother's goal of the birth of a healthy baby. The physician's per-
sonal views about the moral status of the fetus should have no bearing on
his professional conduct. In fact, a physician who intentionally renders
less than the best possible obstetrical care during the course of a wanted
pregnancy because he views the fetus as a nonperson until birth would be
subject to the same moral condemnation as a physician who intentionally
renders inferior medical care on the basis of a patient's race or economic
status.
When a woman either does not want to continue her pregnancy or
has decided for her own reasons not to submit to medical treatment rec-
ommended to protect or preserve the life of the fetus, however, the physi-
cian's views on the moral status of the fetus-and those of the mother,
for that matter-become critical. A physician who believes that the fetus
is a person from the moment of its conception may feel morally bound
man (in vivo). After fertilization has taken place, the embryo is implanted through the cervix
into the woman's uterus. Often, several embryos are implanted at once. The odds of success-
fully achieving pregnancy by this method are no better than ten to twenty percent. See Acosta
& Garcia, Extracorporeal Fertilization and Embryo Transfer, in J. AIMAN, INFERTILITY: Di-
AGNOSIS AND MANAGEMENT 215 (1984).
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not to carry out the mother's desire to terminate her pregnancy or not to
acquiesce in her refusal of treatment. A physician who thinks the fetus
achieves personhood at some point after conception, but prior to birth,
would feel similarly morally bound if the mother desired the abortion or
refused the treatment after the "moment" the fetus became a person.
Only the physician who believes the fetus is a person only after birth
would feel morally free to accept the mother's desires. Yet, it is likely
that even this physician would experience moral qualms if the mother
were refusing treatment that could benefit the fetus greatly by, for exam-
ple, saving it from severe mental retardation or even death at little or no
risk to herself.
Arguably, as medicine has developed and physicians have acquired
the skill and knowledge to treat the fetus directly, the fetus has become a
patient separate from its mother. In this sense, a "patient" would be
defined as a human organism that can benefit from direct medical inter-
vention. Today, medical intervention can not only preserve the life of
certain fetuses that would otherwise die, but it can also maintain or en-
hance fetal health by preventing some dysfunction, pain, or disfigurement
that the fetus would otherwise suffer. Precisely because fetuses can bene-
fit from medical treatment directed at them rather than at their mothers,
they can be viewed as having an increased moral claim to their physi-
cians' medical ministrations, given the physician's general obligation to
help, or at least not to harm, his patients.49
A woman who believes she is morally justified in seeking an abortion
poses little problem for the physician who finds such conduct morally
unacceptable. He can simply refuse to perform the abortion, perhaps
attempt to change the woman's mind, or perhaps refer her to someone
who views abortion differently. In addition, the physician could forcibly
keep the woman from any abortifacient and confine her involuntarily un-
til she delivers. However, this alternative seems morally unacceptable as
an extreme and unwarranted intrusion on the woman's freedom.
A physician who finds a mother's refusal of treatment morally unac-
ceptable because it infringes on the fetus' rights faces a strikingly similar
set of options. First, the physician can terminate his professional rela-
tionship with the pregnant woman. This will be morally permissible,
however, only if the woman does not need medical care or if another
physician is willing to assume immediate responsibility for the medical
49. See generally Nelson, Primum Utilis Esse: The Primacy of Usefulness in Medicine, 51
YALE J. BIOLOGY & MED. 655 (1978) (arguing that there are historical and philosophical
reasons for replacing the first principle of medical ethics, "Do no harm," with "Above all, be
useful").
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care of the woman.50  Second, the physician can try to change the
mother's mind, a morally acceptable course of action at least on its face.
Indeed, a physician who ascribes personhood to the fetus at the time of
the mother's refusal will probably feel morally obligated to try to con-
vince her to change her mind.
However, persuasion may become unethical if it turns into coercion
through the use of threats or misrepresentations. A physician faced with
a pregnant woman's refusal of treatment might overemphasize, or mis-
represent outright, her personal risks in refusing treatment in an effort to
induce her to consent to the treatment. In addition, the physician might
threaten the woman with legal action if she fails to consent. For exam-
ple, the physician might tell the woman that he and the hospital can and
will get a court order that will force her to accept the treatment unless
she relents and accepts the treatment. 51 A woman in this situation might
grudgingly accept the treatment under the belief that she really has no
choice in the matter.
For someone who firmly believes that the fetus has a moral status
that gives it a right to life, threatening the mother with legal compulsion
or lying to her may seem morally justified, perhaps even praiseworthy. 52
Nonetheless, whatever one's perspective of the fetus' moral status, en-
dorsing a physician's use of threats, lies, or misleading representations to
bend a patient's will about the treatment decision is, at the very least, a
morally dangerous professional ethic. 53 The physician-patient relation-
ship is founded upon trust and honesty, not deceit and coercion. As a
competent, autonomous adult, the pregnant woman is ethically entitled
to an honest explanation of her own and her fetus' medical situation and
the limits of the medical knowledge about her case. If the facts that sup-
port treatment are as compelling as the physician believes them to be, the
woman may well change her mind. The physician's moral obligation to
the mother as a patient and a fellow human being require full and fair
disclosure of her situation and forbid deceit intended to curtail her
freedom.
50. Abandoning the woman and leaving her without medical attendance is not unlike
imprisoning the woman intending to abort: ethically, it is too extreme a response to a pregnant
woman's refusal of treatment and looks too much like retribution. Moreover, a physician
could be liable for malpractice if a woman suffered harm for lack of medical attendance.
51. Naturally, this type of conduct is difficult to document, but the authors have knowl-
edge that this has happened on more than one occasion.
52. Those who believe that bombing abortion clinics is morally justified to protect fetal
life, for example, are unlikely to have qualms about lying to, or threatening, a woman who is
refusing treatment thought necessary to save the life or preserve the health of the fetus.
53. See S. BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 238-42 (1978)
(calling for respect and truthfulness from physicians to patients).
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On some occasions, to be sure, there is too little time for the physi-
cian to remonstrate with the woman and still perform the treatment
needed to protect the fetus. If this is the case, the physician's choice is
either to honor the woman's refusal or to force treatment upon her.
Although in one reported case a team of physicians took it upon them-
selves to force a pregnant woman to undergo treatment, 54 such a choice
is ethically questionable. First, by refusing treatment, the pregnant wo-
man has chosen to put her interests or other values above the interests of
the fetus. Given the lack of consensus about the moral status of the fetus
and the proper resolution of the maternal-fetal conflict of interests, it is
arbitrary to claim that the physician's decision to protect the fetus, rather
than to honor the pregnant woman's decision to refuse treatment, is the
morally correct choice. Forced treatment ignores the mother's right to
self-determination. It intrudes upon her bodily integrity and thus vio-
lates the fundamental moral principle that no one should invade or at-
tack the body of another without consent-whether it is with a fist, a
bullet, a drug, or a scalpel.
In addition, one who forces treatment upon an unconsenting adult is
placing his judgment about this most intimate and personal matter above
that of another, and is enforcing it with physical might. This course of
action is morally presumptuous, if not perilous. Is it morally justifiable
for someone to kidnap a dear friend who he fervently believes is about to
enter into a disastrous and destructive marriage? Is it morally justifiable
to stand in front of a movie theater which is showing pornography and
physically prevent adults from entering, even to the point of assaulting
them? These tactics are unacceptable, mainly because the use of physical
power to enforce one's moral convictions is too invasive of the rights of
others and out of proportion to the "harm" that may be caused by the
objectionable behavior. Moreover, the trust and confidence reposed in
physicians by patients who may be weaker and vulnerable undermines
any moral justification for the use of coercion or force.
A pregnant woman is in a unique situation. If a woman refusing
medical treatment were not pregnant, only her interests would be di-
rectly at stake. During pregnancy, however, the woman literally encloses
another being, the fetus, to which she is directly, physically, and inti-
mately attached. What she does or fails to do can have an immediate
physical effect on this other being in a manner truly singular in human
experience.5 5 As long as the fetus remains within her, the pregnant wo-
54. See Jurow & Paul, supra note 39, at 597.
55. This is not to deny that what one person does can significantly affect another. A
suicide can profoundly affect the deceased's loved ones, even physically. Yet, no one other
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man is connected to that being in a way that no other person is connected
to any living person. In contrast, after the fetus is born and the two are
separated, the mother could refuse life-saving treatment and leave the
baby motherless, but she would not take her child to the grave with
her.
56
The unique physical relationship between a pregnant woman and
her fetus complicates any resolution of the conflict between them. As the
fetus' claim to receive medical treatment necessarily requires the invasion
of the mother's body, the conflict between the two intensifies, and the
consequences of resolving the conflict become much more serious. This
same problem is not present when a parent refuses treatment of a living
child.
Also, as in the few reported cases, the woman who refuses treatment
often does so in the course of what otherwise appears to be a wanted
pregnancy. This may lead the attending practitioners to question her
motives. They might label her a "bad mother," or assert that she is being
abusive of her "child," or is acting contrary to the natural bonds of affec-
tion between a mother and her soon-to-be-born child. A woman in this
situation is likely to be viewed with suspicion and to be treated
unsympathetically.
One might argue that, rather than imposing treatment pursuant to
his own moral views, the physician should attempt to evaluate the wo-
man's reasons for refusal and to determine whether they are sufficiently
reasonable or weighty to prevail. Under this approach, however, it can
be very difficult to distinguish a "good" reason from a "bad" one, or a
"rational" choice from an "irrational" choice.57 More importantly, if the
than a pregnant woman (except, perhaps, Siamese twins) can, for example, drink poison and
have that same poison directly cause the demise of another being. In short, although all
human beings are connected to each other by emotional and spiritual bonds, a pregnant wo-
man and her fetus are physically connected in a most intimate and unique fashion.
56. Once a fetus is born alive, its moral and physical relationship with its mother clearly
changes. Medical treatment of a live-born infant no longer requires invasion of the mother's
body, although treatment of the infant could still be performed against her will. The ethics of
treating a live-born infant against its mother's wishes are significantly different than treating a
pregnant woman's own body against her wishes. For a discussion elsewhere in this symposium
of issues involved in withholding treatment from seriously impaired newborns, see Shapiro &
Barthel, Infant Care Review Committees: A More Effective Approach, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 827
(1986); Smith, Disabled Newborns and the Federal Child Abuse Amendments: Tenuous Protec-
tion, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 765 (1986).
57. For example, how would one go about evaluating whether a Jehovah's Witness' re-
fusal of a blood transfusion was rational or sensible? Jehovah's Witnesses believe that the
Scriptures forbid "drinking blood" and that receiving a transfusion is the equivalent of "drink-
ing blood." See Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment. Bodily
Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 228 n.2 (1973); Ford, Refusal of
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moral right of a competent adult to self-determination is to have any
meaning, her reasons for choosing as she does must prevail over the opin-
ion of someone else who views those reasons as insufficient or irrational.
In short, it is not the nature of the woman's reasons that should deter-
mine whether others must respect her ethical entitlement to choose or to
reject treatment for herself and her fetus. Rather, it is the exercise of a
competent adult's freedom of choice that others should respect.
Deference to a pregnant woman's choice regarding treatment is, in
the end, less morally troubling than forced treatment against her will.
Allowing the mother to prevail respects her personal dignity, preserves
her bodily integrity, and allows her full exercise of her freedom of choice,
although it potentially may entail harm to the fetus. Upholding the wo-
man's refusal avoids the hopeless and unprincipled task of deciding
whether her refusal of treatment is "reasonable" or "acceptable" to the
attending physician or to someone else. Finally, respecting the woman's
refusal not only avoids imposing a particular view of the moral status of
the fetus in the face of profound moral uncertainty about that status, but
also precludes the possibility that the woman will be treated prejudicially
because of her perceived "callousness" toward the fetus.
Legal Dilemma of the Medical Practitioner
In addition to honoring the pregnant woman's refusal of treatment
or forcing treatment upon her, the attending physician and others in-
volved in her care have a third option: they may seek a court order to
compel the woman to undergo the treatment recommended to protect
the fetus. As there is no affirmative legal duty to seek or obtain such an
order,58 the decision to invoke the legal process must be made on other
grounds. If a medical practitioner involved in a pregnant woman's care
firmly believes that her refusal is morally wrong, he may well feel mor-
ally compelled to seek a treatment order. The order, if granted, may
avoid harm to the fetus and would provide legal protection for the practi-
tioner administering treatment.
A court order avoids the legal risks inherent in performing the treat-
ment over the pregnant woman's objections and precludes a private indi-
vidual from making the critical decision about forced treatment.
Blood Transfusions by Jehovah's Witnesses, 10 CATH. LAW. 212, 213 (1964). There is no
meaningful way to evaluate the reasonableness or merit of a belief in the authority of the
Scriptures or of a judgment that receiving a blood transfusion is the equivalent of an activity
prohibited by the Scriptures. For an excellent example of the intellectual morass awaiting a
judge who attempts to analyze this belief of Jehovah's Witnesses, see In re Clark, 21 Ohio Op.
2d 86, 89, 185 N.E.2d 128, 132 (C.P. Lucas County 1962).
58. See infra text accompanying notes 69-70.
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However, it does not evade the ethical issues involved. The very decision
to seek a court order implicates important moral values. If a physician
or hospital seeks a judicial order compelling treatment, the pregnant wo-
man's privacy will be invaded and her expectation of confidentiality
about her medical treatment disregarded because the facts of her case
will be disclosed, at least to the judge and his staff and perhaps to the
general public as well. 59 In addition, the patient would be thrust invol-
untarily into the legal system, required to obtain legal counsel if she is to
be properly represented in any related legal proceeding, and forced to
defend her choice at a time when she may be physically ill-disposed to do
so as a result of her medical condition. Moreover, the litigation might
have to be resolved within hours, not within years as with most other
lawsuits.
Nevertheless, if the law arguably supports judicial compulsion of
medical treatment in certain situations, it is difficult to characterize the
choice to seek a judicial order as morally objectionable. One who sin-
cerely believes a pregnant woman's refusal of treatment is tantamount to
direct harm of another person may feel ethically obligated to use socially
sanctioned means to prevent that harm. It is a serious matter for anyone
to attempt to use the coercive power of the state to force his moral beliefs
upon others, but in our society, the law frequently enforces morality. 60
In any event, the choice to seek a judicial order certainly involves com-
peting moral values. These same moral values are at stake in, for exam-
ple, the abortion decision, and in the very controversy that constitutes
the subject of this article. The same lack of consensus that surrounds the
moral status of the fetus and that supports a pregnant woman's right to
59. The judicial proceeding challenging the woman's decisions could be held in camera or
conducted pseudonymously in order to protect her identity from public discovery and to main-
tain the confidentiality of her medical situation. Cf. Bossier City Medical Suite, Inc. v. City of
Bossier City, 483 F. Supp. 633, 644 (W.D. La. 1980) ("The chilling effect of publicly airing so
private a matter as the decision to terminate a pregnancy may well preclude a woman from
seeking vindication of her constitutional rights .. " (citations omitted)). But it may become a
public matter if the judge denies a request to protect the identities of the parties. Compare the
proposal elsewhere in this symposium for the application of an invasion of privacy tort to
private parties seeking to compel treatment of seriously impaired newborns in Vitiello, Baby
Jane Doe: Stating a Cause of Action Against the Officious Interneddler, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 863
(1986).
60. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stowell, 389 Mass. 171, 449 N.E.2d 357 (1983) (constitu-
tional right of privacy does not bar the criminal prosecution of consenting adults who commit
adultery in private). CAL. PENAL CODE § 227 (West Supp. 1986) (making fighting a duel and
sending or accepting a challenge to fight a duel a crime); Id. § 597 (making cruelty to animals
a crime); Id. § 647(c) (prohibiting persons from accosting someone in any public place for the
purpose of begging or soliciting alms).
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choose her interests over those of her fetus arguably supports the right of
those who favor the fetus' interests to plead their case to a court of law.
In the final analysis, however, the controversy generated by a preg-
nant woman's refusal of treatment beneficial to her fetus, and perhaps
critical to the fetus' life, is rarely going to be resolved as a "pure" moral
decision. In practice, few physicians will force treatment on a competent
pregnant woman in light of the serious legal consequences of such an act.
Forcing a woman to undergo medical treatment, such as a Cesarean sec-
tion, for the sake of the fetus would be a civilly actionable battery.61 Be-
cause battery is an intentional tort, the attending physician and any
others who participated in treating the woman would be liable in com-
pensatory damages for all harm proximately caused by the treatment,
regardless of whether they intended the harm or performed the treatment
in a nonnegligent manner. They would face the possibility of punitive
damages as well. 62 Furthermore, the physician's medical malpractice in-
surer may not be obligated to defend the physician or to pay any dam-
ages assessed because battery is an intentional, rather than a negligent,
act. 63 Consequently, any compensatory or punitive damages assessed
could be the personal responsibility of the physician.
In addition to a battery action, the attending physician and others
involved in compelling the treatment could be subject to civil actions for
professional negligence, breach of confidentiality, invasion of privacy, or
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 64 If the pregnant woman
were treated in a public hospital, the woman also might have a civil
rights action against the physician, the hospital, and others involved in
her care.6 5 Finally, it is not inconceivable that criminal battery charges
61. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 240, 502 P.2d 1, 8, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 512 (1972).
62. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 40-41 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER & KEETON].
63. Waters v. Bourhis, 40 Cal. 3d 424, 429-30, 709 P.2d 469, 472-73, 220 Cal. Rptr. 666,
669 (1985) (insurer brings declaratory judgment against insured alleging that insurance policy
does not cover intentional torts); Annot., 33 A.L.R.4TH 14, 31-32 (1984) (effect of assault and
battery on physician's malpractice insurance coverage).
64. See Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 287 So. 2d 824 (1973) (breach of confidential
relationship); Waters v. Bourhis, 40 Cal. 3d 424, 709 P.2d 469, 220 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1985)
(claims of intentional misconduct and professional negligence not mutually exclusive); Mac-
Donald v. Clinger, 84 A.D.2d 482, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1982) (breach of confidential relation-
ship); Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201, 213-14, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 676-77 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977)
(invasion of privacy); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 62, at 54-66 (infliction of emotional
distress).
65. See Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125, 128 (N.D. I11. 1972) (Defendant
public hospital was sued under Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), for "medically
treating decedent in a manner inconsistent with his religious beliefs" while acting under color
of state law.).
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could be brought against the attending physician.66
In summary, the legal consequences of treating a competent adult
pregnant woman67 against her will without a court order are so serious
that a cautious attorney advising the physician or hospital could hardly
recommend facing them. In light of these risks, it is not likely that many
physicians or hospitals would treat a pregnant woman over her objection
without judicial authorization, notwithstanding their moral beliefs. Con-
sequently, as a practical matter, the maternal-fetal conflict probably will
be resolved in one of two ways-either the physician will honor the preg-
nant woman's wishes or the judicial system will determine whether to
compel treatment.
The Law and Forced Treatment of Pregnant Women
Because of the serious risk of legal liability, few physicians or other
health care practitioners will treat a competent pregnant woman against
her will without a court order. A critical question arises as to whether
the law supports the issuance of an order compelling a pregnant woman
to undergo treatment for the sake of her fetus. If a physician can obtain
such a judicial order, he presumably would be immune from civil or
criminal liability for properly performing the authorized treatment. 68
Although no court order absolutely immunizes the physician or other
practitioners from any liability, it provides much greater legal protection
than if the physician or other practitioners acted without such an order.
Because no statute, regulation, or judicial decision places an affirma-
66. Assume a competent nonpregnant adult refused surgical amputation of a gangrenous
limb after being properly informed of the risks of such a choice, and a surgeon who sincerely
believed that the patient had made a wrong and irrational choice wheeled the protesting pa-
tient to the operating room, physically restrained the patient, placed her under general anes-
thesia, and cut off the diseased limb. Assume also that the disease had not endangered the
patient's life, but that it possibly might do so at some point in the future. This kind of interfer-
ence with the person of another, though probably well-intentioned, seems to be the type of
conduct that the criminal law generally is meant to deter and punish. There is no theoretical
bar to bringing criminal battery charges against the surgeon in this hypothetical case or even
homicide charges if the patient died as a result of the general anesthesia. A competent adult
pregnant woman should not be denied the protection of the criminal law simply because she is
carrying a fetus.
67. Clinicians face a different situation with a pregnant minor. If the minor is so young or
immature that she cannot give or withhold informed consent to treatment, then she should be
treated as if she were an incompetent adult. See supra note 1. However, if she is mature
enough to understand the nature and consequences of her decisions regarding medical treat-
ment, she may have the legal right to control her own medical fate. See CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 34.5 (West 1982) (minor has ability to consent to treatment for pregnancy on her own).
68. A physician may enjoy immunity from legal liability for actions taken pursuant to a
court order, provided that he is not negligent in implementing the order. See In re Spring, 380
Mass. 629, 638-39, 405 N.E.2d 115, 122 (1980).
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tive duty on physicians or other practitioners to seek a court order that
would override the wishes of any competent adult patient, including a
pregnant woman, it is unlikely that a practitioner could be held legally
liable for honoring a pregnant woman's informed refusal of treatment. 69
There is no reported case imposing civil damages or criminal penalties on
any physician for failing to seek judicial review of a competent adult's
refusal of treatment. In fact, courts have flatly rejected the notion that a
physician could be held civilly or criminally liable for honoring a compe-
tent adult's refusal of medical treatment.70
This section begins with the threshold question of when, if ever,
courts have jurisdiction to consider a petition filed by a physician, a hos-
pital, or some third party seeking a judicial order compelling treatment.
Next, it analyzes the legal status of the fetus and the interests of the state
in protecting the fetus. Finally, this section examines the legal interests
of the pregnant woman who has refused treatment that may benefit her
fetus.
Jurisdiction
No state has a statute expressly granting any court jurisdiction over
disputes concerning a pregnant woman's refusal of treatment when the
refusal puts her fetus at risk of injury or death. All states, however, have
statutes prohibiting child abuse and neglect.71 While definitions of child
abuse and neglect vary among the states, 72 parental failure to provide
adequate medical care can constitute neglect.73 In addition, all states
have statutes authorizing the state to assume the custody and control of a
minor whose parents or guardian have endangered the minor's welfare
69. To avoid possible malpractice liability, the attending physician must inform the pa-
tient of the risks and consequences of refusing treatment. Truman v. Thomas, 27 Cal. 3d 285,
292, 611 P.2d 902, 905, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308, 312 (1980).
70. E.g., Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 197, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 226
(1984); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 377, 420 N.E.2d 64, 71, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 273 (1981).
71. For a complete list and analysis of these statutes, see Katz, Howe & McGrath, Child
Neglect Laws in America, 9 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1975).
72. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11 165(c)(2) (West Supp. 1986) ("general neglect" de-
fined as failure of parent to make an informed and appropriate medical decision regarding a
child's care after consultation with a physician who has examined the child); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 201.090(3) (1983) (neglected child is any person under 18 years of age not provided with the
necessities of life by its parents).
73. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1986) (failure to furnish necessary
medical attendance or other remedial care without lawful excuse is a crime); id. § 11 165(c)(2)
(child who does not receive specified medical treatment for religious reasons is not for that
reason alone a neglected child).
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by neglect or commission.7 4 Statutes allowing the state to assume cus-
tody and control of an endangered minor have been used as the jurisdic-
tional basis for judicial orders compelling a pregnant woman to submit to
treatment for the sake of her fetus.7 5
The critical question with respect to child neglect statutes as a juris-
dictional basis for judicial action in a case of maternal-fetal conflict is
whether the fetus is a "child" within the meaning of the applicable stat-
ute. While child neglect statutes are intended to protect live-born chil-
dren under the specified age of majority, only one expressly defines the
term "child" to include a fetus.7 6 In all likelihood, legislators were not
considering fetuses when they drafted child neglect statutes.
7 7
The lack of express legislative intent has led two appellate courts to
conclude that fetuses are not within the scope of child neglect statutes.
In In re Steven S.,78 a California court of appeal held that an unborn
fetus is not a "person" within the meaning of the statute conferring juris-
diction on the juvenile court to adjudge any "person under the age of 18
years" a dependent child of the court on certain specified grounds. 79
While the mother was in the process of challenging her confinement in a
psychiatric facility, the county sought to have her fetus declared a depen-
dent child. The district attorney 8° informed the juvenile court that, be-
cause of insufficient evidence that she was mentally ill, it would not
attempt to keep the mother confined. The court then ordered the fetus,
and hence the mother, detained pending its adjudication on the merits of
the dependent child petition. Subsequently, the juvenile court sustained
74. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 30:4C-11 (West 1981).
75. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 87, 274 S.E.2d 457,
459 (1981); In re Unborn Baby Wilson, No. 81-108 AV (Calhoun County P. Ct. Feb. 3, 1981).
aff'd, No. 81-108 AV (Calhoun County P. Ct. Mar. 9, 1981), leave to appeal denied, No. 57436
(Mich. Ct. App. July 28, 1981); In re Baby Jeffries, No. 14004 (Jackson County P. Ct. Mich.
May 24, 1982); Bowes & Selgestad, Fetal Versus Maternal Rights: Medical and Legal Perspec-
tives, 58 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 209, 209-10 (1981) (unreported juvenile court case).
76. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C- 11 (West 1981).
77. Even those who tend to favor judicial intervention to protect the fetus admit this. See
Myers, supra note 4, at 26.
78. 126 Cal. App. 3d 23, 178 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1981).
79. Id. at 28-30, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 527-28; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West Supp.
1986) ("Any person under the age of 18 years who comes within any of the following descrip-
tions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge that person to be a
dependent child of the court: . . . Who is in need of proper and effective parental care or
control."). Section 300 has been used as a jurisdictional basis for the state's challenge to a
parent's refusal to consent to medical treatment of a child. In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d
796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979).
80. In Los Angeles, the Office of the County Counsel handles dependent child petitions,
while the District Attorney's office litigates mental health cases.
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the petition, and the mother's detention continued until she gave birth.
At that time, she was released, the child was placed in a foster home, and
the mother disappeared.
The court of appeal reversed and explained its holding by noting
that previous decisions had not found fetuses to be "persons" within the
meaning of various statutes and that when the legislature intended stat-
utes to include fetuses, it said so explicitly. 81 In light of these facts, the
court declined to construe "section 300 to expand the meaning of the
term 'person' to include an 'unborn fetus,'" and thus found the order of
the juvenile court asserting jurisdiction over the unborn fetus lacking in
statutory authority.82 The court also disapproved of the use of the juve-
nile proceedings to detain the mother for two months in circumvention
of the state's mental health laws.83
Similarly, in In re Dittrick Infant,84 a Michigan court of appeals
held that the state juvenile code did not apply to unborn fetuses. 85 In
that case, a woman became pregnant while a proceeding against her for
physical and sexual abuse of her children was pending. Prior to the
birth, the probate court directed a state agency to take custody of the
fetus pursuant to the juvenile code. The appellate court recognized that
the word "child" could be "read as applying even to unborn persons,"
yet ultimately concluded "that the Legislature did not intend application
of these provisions to unborn children."'86
In contrast, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed a juvenile court
order giving a county social welfare agency temporary custody of a fetus
as a "deprived child without proper parental care necessary for his or her
physical health" after its mother refused a Cesarean section.87 Interest-
81. In re Steven S., 126 Cal. App. 3d at 28-30, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 527-28. In an influential
decision that preceded Steven S., the California Supreme Court ruled that a fetus was not a
"person" within the meaning of the wrongful death statute. Justus v. Atchinson, 19 Cal. 3d
564, 579-80, 565 P.2d 122, 132-33, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 107-08 (1977).
82. Steven S., 126 Cal. App. 3d at 29-30, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 528.
83. Id. at 30-31, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 528-29. The county's action to have the fetus declared
a ward of the court clearly was meant to circumvent the mental health laws by detaining the
mother on some ground other than her mental status. For a report of a case in which a
schizophrenic pregnant woman was involuntarily detained without treatment, in a psychiatric
facility in order to prevent her from harming the fetus, see Soloff, Jewell & Roth, Civil Com-
mitment and the Rights of the Unborn, 136 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 114 (1979). The woman was
not treated with psychoactive drugs because of the "small but present dangers of medication to
the fetus in the third trimester." Id. at 114.
84. 80 Mich. App. 219, 263 N.W.2d 37 (1977).
85. Id. at 223, 263 N.W.2d at 39.
86. Id.
87. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 87, 274 S.E.2d 457,
459 (1981). GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-301 (Harrison Supp. 1985) grants the juvenile court exclu-
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ingly, one justice noted in a concurring opinion that he believed "the
legislature intended that the juvenile courts exercise jurisdiction only
where a child has seen the light of day. I am aware of no 'child depriva-
tion' proceeding wherein the 'child' was unborn. '88 Nonetheless, the jus-
tice found the trial court's action to be a "proper exercise of its equitable
jurisdiction with respect to both the mother and the fetus." 89
Irrespective of the applicability of the pertinent child neglect statute,
a petitioner seeking compulsory treatment might simply invoke the
court's general equity jurisdiction. The equitable powers of the courts
are commonly considered to be aimed at effecting justice among the par-
ties and ordering that which in good conscience ought to be done to settle
the dispute.90 In addition, equity is intended to grapple with novel cases
and conditions.91 Accordingly, it would seem that many courts would be
receptive to an appeal to their equity jurisdiction in order to hear the
merits of a claim that a pregnant woman should be forced to accept med-
ical treatment. In one reported decision, the court did not even directly
address the jurisdictional question. It simply stated, "We are satisfied
that the unborn child is entitled to the law's protection .... "92
In addition, a petitioner could claim that a court has jurisdiction
because of the state's interest in the fetus pursuant to its parens patriae
power.93 Parens patriae has been described as a "prerogative... inher-
ent in the supreme power of every State. . . . [I]t is a most beneficent
function, and often necessary to be exercised in the interests of humanity,
and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect them-
selves."' 94 While the parens patriae power extends to the protection of
sive original jurisdiction over juvenile matters and requires that it be the only court initiating
action concerning any "child." A "child" is defined as "any individual under the age of 17
years." Id. § 24A-401(c)(1).
88. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 92, 274 S.E.2d 457,
461-62 (1981) (Smith, J., concurring) (citation and footnote omitted).
89. Id. at 92, 274 S.E.2d at 462 (citing Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v.
Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (per curiam), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964)). Raleigh
Fitkin is discussed infra text accompanying note 92.
90. Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 2d 309, 331, 44 P.2d 547, 557 (1935)
("Equity ... will assert itself in those situations where right and justice would be defeated but
for its intervention.").
91. Id. ("Equity does not wait upon precedent which exactly squares with the facts in
controversy ... ").
92. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 423, 201
A.2d 537, 538 (per curiam), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
93. See generally Myers, supra note 4, at 22-23 (describing parens patriae power).
94. Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890).
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live-born children,95 the question remains whether it also extends to the
fetus.96
In summary, a particular state's child neglect law may or may not
provide a jurisdictional basis for a petition seeking to compel a pregnant
woman to undergo treatment, depending upon the court's interpretation
of the application of the law to fetuses. 97 Irrespective of the child neglect
law, a court may well find that general equity or parens patriae jurisdic-
tion exists. In short, jurisdiction for petitions to compel treatment re-
mains an open question, even in states such as California and
Michigan. 98 Furthermore, it is unlikely that many judges would dismiss
a petition for compelled treatment on jurisdictional grounds without at
least reviewing the merits of the dispute, particularly if it is characterized
as a "life-or-death" matter by the petitioner's counsel. 99 Finally, the ur-
gency of the situation may also lead judges to rule on the merits of a
petition seeking compelled treatment even though the pregnant woman
may be unrepresented and no true adversary hearing is held. 100
95. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944) (state may pass child wel-
fare laws even if such laws interfere with parental authority).
96. In light of the arguments set forth in this Article, the parens patriae power should be
understood not to encompass unborn fetuses.
97. Some commentators have argued strongly that these laws should apply to fetuses.
See, e.g., Myers, supra note 4, at 26-31. The major problem with this position is that legisla-
tures most probably did not intend these statutes to pertain to fetuses. Id. at 26. Moreover,
there is a critical difference between a fetus and a live-born child: to address the "abuse or
neglect" of the former, the state must invade the mother's body and liberty.
98. The trial court in In re Unborn Baby Wilson, No. 81-108 AV (Calhoun County P. Ct.
Feb. 3, 1981), aff'd, No. 81-108 AV (Calhoun County P. Ct. Mar. 9, 1981), leave to appeal
denied, No. 57436 (Mich. Ct. App. July 28, 1981), avoided In re Dittrick Infant, 80 Mich.
App. 219, 263 N.W.2d 37 (1977), by distinguishing it in a less than convincing manner. The
authors are aware by way of anecdote that at least one juvenile court in southern California
has ruled, in spite of In re Stephen S., 126 Cal. App. 3d 23, 198 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1981), that an
unborn fetus can be made a ward of the court under CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West
Supp. 1986) and the mother can be forced to undergo treatment. The local child protective
services agency apparently was instrumental in obtaining the juvenile court's order in this case.
99. In an apparent emergency, with the fetus' life and health at stake, and perhaps the
mother's as well, judges may be inclined to act quickly, though not necessarily correctly.
"Judges are not terribly good at making emergency decisions.... It is inappropriate for judges
to act impulsively, without benefit of reflection on past precedent and the likely future impact
of their opinions." Annas, supra note 4, at 17.
100. It is a violation of procedural due process for a court to order a pregnant woman to
undergo treatment before a full and fair adversary hearing on the matter. See Boddie v. Con-
necticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971) ("Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive
society is more fundamental than its erection and enforcement of a system of rules defining the
various rights and duties of its members, enabling them to govern their affairs and definitively
settle their differences in an orderly, predictable manner."). As Professor Tribe has stated:
[E]ven the most awful tortures, it must be remembered, can be cloaked with such
clockwork logic that many become persuaded of their perverse justice. Turning
square corners, then, must never become a substitute for respecting the humanity of
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Legal Status of the Fetus Under the Common Law
For quite some time, the common law recognized fetuses as beings
with certain legal rights or protections, particularly in the areas of prop-
erty, criminal, and tort law. Blackstone noted that an "infant in ventre sa
mere, or in the mother's womb, is supposed in law to be born for many
purposes."10 1 At common law, a fetus could be named an heir to a dece-
dent's estate, yet a fetus' property rights only vested upon live birth and
if the inheritance inured to its benefit. 10 2 This tradition has been main-
tained in modern American cases 10 3 and in the Uniform Probate
Code. 10 4 Thus, property law does not confer the full rights of per-
sonhood upon the fetus. Instead, it creates a means of fulfilling the inten-
tions of testators by protecting the right of a fetus to inherit property
upon live birth.105
Similarly, the criminal law did not give full legal recognition to the
fetus. Historically, the criminal law did not recognize the killing of an
unborn fetus as a homicide, 10 6 considering the fetus to be a homicide
victim only if it had been born alive.' 0 7 This rule has been adopted by
each individual. It should be even clearer that, when an individual's bodily integrity
is at stake, a determination that the state has indeed accorded procedurally adequate
protection should not be made lightly. Since bodily invasions cannot be as readily
remedied after the fact (through damage awards) as can at least some deprivations of
property, it ought to follow, in particular, that the state, absent a clear emergency,
must precede any deliberate invasion by an adversary hearing, even if only an infor-
mal one. "The infliction of physical pain is final and irreparable; it cannot be undone
in a subsequent proceeding."
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 915-16 (1978) (emphasis in original) (citation
and footnote omitted).
101. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *130; see Myers, supra note 4, at 4-6.
102. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 101, at *130 n.7.
103. See, e.g., In re Peabody, 5 N.Y.2d 541, 547, 158 N.E.2d 841, 845, 186 N.Y.S.2d 265,
270 (1959) ("[A] child il ventre sa mere is not regarded as a person until it sees the light of
day."); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
104. "Relatives of the decedent conceived before his death but born thereafter inherit as if
they had been born in the lifetime of the decedent." UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-108
(1983).
105. See Lenow, The Fetus as a Patient: Emerging Rights as a Person?, 9 AM. J.L. & MED.
1, 4 (1984); Myers, supra note 4, at 4.
106. "Since at least the fourteenth century, the common law has been that the destruction
of a fetus in utero is not a homicide .... The rule has been accepted as the established
common law in every American jurisdiction that has considered the question." Common-
wealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1328 (Mass. 1984) (citations omitted) (departing from the
accepted rule and holding that viable fetus is a "person" for purposes of vehicular homicide
statute).
107. See, e.g., People v. Greer, 79 Il. 2d 103, 111, 402 N.E.2d 203, 207 (1980) (A fetus is
the victim of murder only if it is born alive and subsequently dies of the injuries inflicted by the
assailant.); Hollis v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 61, 62 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983) (same).
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the Model Penal Code as well.10 8 In a few jurisdictions, however, a fetus
can be the victim of manslaughter 0 9 or vehicular homicide. 110
The evolution of California's criminal law regarding the killing of a
fetus is a paradigm of the amorphous and unsettled legal status of the
fetus. In Keeler v. Superior Court, II the California Supreme Court de-
cided that a viable fetus, though stillborn as the result of an assault upon
its mother, was not a "human being" for purposes of the murder stat-
ute. 12 Shortly after Keeler, the California legislature amended this mur-
der statute by adding "a fetus" to the list of possible murder victims.1 1 3
The omission of a legislative definition of a "fetus" was apparently in-
tended to avoid political difficulties. 14 However, the legislature did spec-
ify that the statute would not apply when death of a fetus resulted from
an act "solicited, aided, abetted, or consented to by the mother of the
fetus."'1 15 This provision differs dramatically from the traditional rule
that consent is not a defense to murder." 16
Six years after Keeler and the amendment of section 187, a Califor-
nia court of appeal interpreted the term "fetus" in the statute to refer
only to a "viable unborn child" in People v. Smith. 117 The prosecution
had unsuccessfully urged the court to interpret the term "fetus" to in-
clude any product of conception old enough to be correctly called a fetus
rather than an embryo." 8 The court declined to adopt this position:
Legally and factually, a non-viable fetus does not possess the ca-
pability for independent existence and has not attained the status of
independent human life. Logically, one cannot destroy independent
human life prior to the time it has come into existence. Until the capa-
bility for independent human life is attained, there is only the expec-
tancy and potentiality for human life. 119
108. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1(1) (1980).
109. See, eg., State v. Willis, 457 So. 2d 959 (Miss. 1984) (willful killing of unborn quick
child is chargeable as manslaughter, willful killing of mother is chargeable as murder, and
charges do not merge).
110. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1330 (Mass. 1984).
111. 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970).
112. Id. at 631, 470 P.2d at 624, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
113. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West Supp. 1986).
114. "The legislative history of the 1970 amendment... suggests the term 'fetus' was left
undefined and open to construction in order to ensure passage of the amendment in the face of
divided legislative views about its meaning and intended purpose." People v. Smith, 59 Cal.
App. 3d 751, 756, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498, 501 (1976) (citation omitted).
115. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(b)(3) (West Supp. 1986).
116. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 408 (1972).
117. 59 Cal. App. 3d 751, 759, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498, 504 (1976).
118. The prosecution argued that a product of conception older than 12 weeks is a fetus.
Id. at 755, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 502-03.
119. Id. at 756, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 502 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973)).
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Smith followed Roe v. Wade120 by defining "viability" as "capability
for independent existence."' 2' The court read Roe v. Wade to rest on the
rationale that "until viability is reached, human life in the legal sense has
not come into existence. Implicit in Wade is the conclusion that as a
matter of constitutional law the destruction of a nonviable fetus is not a
taking of human life."' 122
At common law, inducing the abortion of a "quick" fetus was a
misdemeanor unless the operation was necessary to save the woman's
life. 123 If performed before quickening, an abortion was not a crime at
common law for either the mother or the abortionist. 124 A homicide was
committed only if the quickened fetus was born alive and subsequently
died of its prenatal injuries. 125 Under an 1828 New York statute, abort-
ing a prequick fetus was a misdemeanor, while aborting a quickened fetus
could be punished as manslaughter.126 According to Roe v. Wade, a ma-
jority of states by the 1950s had banned all abortions regardless of
whether the fetus was quick. 127 Wade fundamentally changed the crimi-
nal law regarding abortions by preventing states from prohibiting the
abortions of fetuses that had not yet reached the point of viability.
Changes in tort law over the last century have granted fetuses more
extensive rights.' 28 Over one hundred years ago, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court in Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton 129 de-
nied recovery for the death of a four- to five-month-old fetus caused by
120. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
121. 59 Cal. App. 3d at 757, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 502 (quoting Wade, 410 U.S. at 163).
122. 59 Cal. App. 3d at 757, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 502. Interestingly, in 1985 the California
Legislature amended the Penal Code adding, five years to the sentence of a felon who, during
the commission or attempted commission of a felony, injures a woman whom he knew or
reasonably should have known to be pregnant and this injury results in the death of the fetus.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.9 (West Supp. 1986).
123. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 188 (3d ed. 1982). The term "quicken-
ing" is defined as "[t]he signs of life felt by the mother as a result of the fetal movements,
usually noted first in the fourth or fifth month of pregnancy." T. STEDMAN, STEDMAN'S IL-
LUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1183 (5th ed. 1982).
124. Means, The Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the Status of the Foetus, 1664-
1968: A Case of Cessation of Constitutionality, 14 N.Y.L. FORUM 411, 420 (1968).
125. Id. at 426-28.
126. Id. at 441-53.
127. Wade, 410 U.S. at 139. For an illuminating historical analysis of nineteenth-century
law regarding abortion and a scholarly presentation of persuasive arguments that neither
Wade nor abortion law provides any intelligible concept of person in law, see White, The
Concept of Person, The Law, and the Use of the Fetus in Biomedicine, in ABORTION AND THE
STATUS OF THE FETUS 119 (W. Bondeson, H. Engelhardt, Jr., S. Spicker & D. Winship eds.
1983).
128. See Lenow, supra note 105, at 5-10.
129. 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
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injuries sustained when its mother slipped and fell. 130 Justice Holmes
noted that "as the unborn child was a part of the mother at the time of
the injury, any damage to it which was not too remote to be recovered for
at all was recoverable by [the mother]." 131 The Dietrich rule provided
the basis for a generally accepted rule that denied recovery for fetal inju-
ries and conditioned recovery in a wrongful death action on the live birth
of the fetus. 132
The Dietrich rule was uniformly followed for over half a century,
until a federal district court in Bonbrest v. Kotz 133 held that there may be
recovery for tortious injury to a viable fetus subsequently born alive. 134
Later cases discarded viability as a factor limiting liability for prenatal
injuries and awarded damages for injuries incurred at any point in gesta-
tion if the fetus was born alive.'35 Prosser noted that the demise of the
Dietrich rule was "up till that time the most spectacular abrupt reversal
of a well settled rule in the whole history of the law of torts."'136
Judicial recognition of a live-born child's right to recover damages
for tortious prenatal injury does not mean that courts recognize unborn
fetuses as persons with full legal rights. Instead, this practice focuses on
the need for compensation of a living person wrongfully injured rather
than on the legal status of the fetus. One commentator has explained this
approach:
The fact that courts permit live born infants to recover damages for
prenatal injuries does not mean that courts view the unborn as 'per-
sons.' Instead, the courts are interested in protecting the interests of
the damaged live born person. The courts are not compensating fe-
tuses but are instead compensating children who need special medical
treatment, schooling, or other services because of the acts of some
tortfeasor. The point in the pregnancy when those acts occur does not
serve to deflect the courts from their rightful goal of compensating the
injured child. This is most strongly indicated by those courts that per-
mit recovery for preconception wrongful acts. 137
130. Id. at 15.
131. Id. at 17.
132. Summerfield v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 467, 474, 698 P.2d 712, 719 (1985) (en
bane); Myers, supra note 4, at 6-7.
133. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
134. Id. at 142.
135. See, eg., Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 504, 93 S.E.2d 727,
728 (1956); Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 486, 147 A.2d 108, 110 (1958); see also Renslow
v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 11. 2d 348, 357, 376 N.E.2d 1250, 1253 (1977) (injured fetus later born
alive may recover for negligent pre-conception maternal blood transfusion). This is the view
adopted by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869(1) (1977).
136. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 62, at 368.
137. Glantz, Is the Fetus a Person? A Lawyer's View, in ABORTION AND THE STATUS OF
THE FETUS 114 (W. Bondeson, H. Engelhardt, Jr., S. Spicker & D. Winship eds. 1983). How-
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Decisions recognizing this "rightful goal" of compensating the live-born
child have been misinterpreted as granting a fetus broad rights it does
not, and should not, possess. For example, when the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Smith v. Brennan 138 recognized a child's cause of ac-
tion for negligently inflicted prenatal injury, 39 the court stated:
There is no question that conception sets in motion biological
processes which if undisturbed will produce what every one will con-
cede to be a person in being. If in the meanwhile those processes can
be disrupted resulting in harm to the child when born, it is immaterial
whether before birth the child is considered a person in being. And
regardless of analogies to other areas of the law, justice requires that
the principle be recognized that a child has a legal right to begin life
with a sound mind and body. 140
The Michigan Court of Appeals has echoed the statement that "a child
has the right to begin life with a sound mind and body."' 14 1
One commentator has attributed this same "right" to fetuses and
suggested that it justifies state intervention to protect fetuses who might
be harmed by maternal "abuse" or "neglect," for example, by a refusal of
medical treatment beneficial to the fetus. 42 One state trial court has re-
ever, at least one court has expressly recognized that a fetus is a "person" under its state
constitution. See Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, 152 Ohio St. 114, 117, 87 N.E.2d 334,
335 (1949).
138. 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960).
139. Id. at 364-68, 157 A.2d at 503-05.
140. Id. at 364, 157 A.2d at 503 (emphasis added).
141. Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 400, 301 N.W.2d 869, 870 (1981) (permitting
a son to proceed in a negligence action against his mother for prenatal injury); see Womack v.
Buchhorn, 384 Mich. 718, 725, 187 N.W.2d 218, 222 (1971) (permitting negligence action by
eight-year-old against third party for prenatal injury). At least one court has refused to recog-
nize any right to begin life with a sound mind and body. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401,
411, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900 (1978) ("There is no precedent for recogni-
tion . . . of 'the fundamental right to be born as a whole, functional human being'....")
(quoting Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110, 114 (1977)). Other cases have
utilized the purported "right" of a child to begin life "with a sound mind and body" in con-
texts other than damage claims for personal injuries. See In re Baby X, 97 Mich. App. I11,
115, 293 N.W.2d 736, 738-39 (1980) (prenatal conduct of mother detrimental to fetus relevant
in child neglect proceeding); Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 525, 171 A.2d 140. 144
(Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1961) (prospectively authorizing blood transfusions to be administered
to a child after birth despite religious objections from the parents); In re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d
658, 669, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, 652 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1970) (authorizing surgery for a minor whose
mother opposed administration of blood transfusions incident to the surgery); In re Clark, 21
Ohio Op. 2d 86, 89, 185 N.E.2d 128, 132 (C.P. Lucas County 1962) (authorizing three-month-
old infant suffering from burns to receive blood transfusions over the parents' religious objec-
tions). These cases are subject to the same criticism that there is no such right in the literal
sense. Nonetheless, one commentator has claimed that these cases support the proposition
that a fetus possesses a right to gestation undisturbed by wrongful injury. Myers, supra note 4.
at 60.
142. Myers, supra note 4, at 60, 64.
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lied on this purported right to justify compelling a diabetic woman to
accept all medical treatment, including insulin by injection, necessary in
the judgment of her physician to protect the fetus from harm.143 This
court found that the fetus was a "child," for jurisdictional and substan-
tive purposes, within the meaning of Michigan's child abuse and neglect
statute. The decision was "most compelled by the legal premise.., that
a child has a legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body" and
ordered that the mother accept medical treatment for the benefit of the
fetus. 44
The Smith v. Brennan decision, often considered the source of the
purported "right" of a fetus to "begin life with a sound mind and body,"
plainly does not establish such a literal right. Rather, Smith recognized
that a live-born child has a right to recover damages for injuries wrong-
fully inflicted upon it prior to birth. 45 This holding does not mean that a
fetus has any particular rights. Faced with an injured, live-born child,
the Smith court expressly recognized that it was "immaterial whether
before birth the child is considered a person in being" that would have
legal rights that could be violated. 146 To claim that Smith stands for the
proposition that everyone owes a duty to a fetus to ensure that it is born
"with a sound mind and body" is to stretch the holding beyond recogni-
tion.' 47 Smith clearly did not intend to expand dramatically the rights of
143. In re Unborn Baby Wilson, No. 81-108 AV (Calhoun County P. Ct. Feb. 3, 1981),
aff'd, No. 81-108 AV (Calhoun County P. Ct. Mar. 9, 1981), leave to appeal denied, No. 57436
(Mich. Ct. App. July 28, 1981). Although the basis for the court's ruling is unclear, another
Michigan trial court has apparently followed Wilson's rationale and ordered a woman to un-
dergo Cesarean section for the benefit of her fetus. In re Baby Jeffries, No. 14004 (Jackson
County P. Ct. May 24, 1982). Jeffries is a notable case for two reasons. First, Judge Sill
ordered the local police to transport Mrs. Jeffries to a hospital and ordered her to admit herself
to the hospital. Id. slip op. at 1. Second, the Jeffries family fled the state the day after the
order was issued, and Mrs. Jeffries delivered a healthy baby vaginally without incident some
three weeks later. Detroit Free Press, June 29, 1982, at A3, col. 3.
144. In re Unborn Baby Wilson, No. 81-108 AV, slip op. at 9-10 (Calhoun County P. Ct.
Feb. 3, 1981) (citing Womack v. Buchhorn, 384 Mich. 718, 187 N.W.2d 218 (1971)), aff'd,
No. 81-108 AV (Calhoun County P. Ct. Mar. 9, 1981), leave to appeal denied, No. 57436
(Mich. Ct. App. July 28, 1981).
145. Smith, 31 N.J. at 366, 157 A.2d at 509; see also Womack v. Buchhorn, 384 Mich. 718,
725, 187 N.W.2d 218, 222 (1971).
146. Smith, 31 N.J. at 364, 157 A.2d at 503.
147. Nonetheless, Professor Robertson has suggested that the law is not precluded from
imposing on the woman who foregoes an abortion "a duty to assure that the fetus is born as
healthy as possible." Robertson, supra note 7, at 352. He supports this suggestion by postulat-
ing that general principles of civil and criminal liability could permit damage actions and
criminal prosecutions against a mother who chooses to forego treatment beneficial to her fetus.
Id. at 352-53. No reported case, however, holds that a mother or father has "a duty to assure
that the fetus is born as healthy as possible." The criminal law typically has rejected the
proposition that a woman can be criminally prosecuted on the ground that she either failed to
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a fetus in such a fashion.
Furthermore, there is no historical or precedential basis for granting
a fetus a legally enforceable right to begin life physically and mentally
intact. There is no case which holds that a live-born person, much less a
fetus, has a right to be healthy or to receive health care from the state or
from any private party. Moreover, simply asserting that a fetus has a
"right" to be born healthy is an insufficient reason for forcing a mother
to receive medical treatment against her will and in derogation of her
rights to bodily integrity, privacy, self-determination, and perhaps to reli-
gious freedom as well. These rights of the mother are far better
grounded in both common and constitutional law than any supposed
right of a fetus to be born healthy.
As in personal injury tort law, the rights of a fetus under wrongful
death statutes have evolved over the years. At one time, virtually all
jurisdictions required live birth as a prerequisite to recovery in an action
for the injury or wrongful death of a fetus. 148 Two justifications for this
rule emerge from the cases. First, the defendant could owe no duty of
do something that could have benefitted her fetus or performed some acts harmful to the fetus.
See, e.g., Reyes v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 216, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912, 913 (1977)
(acquitting mother of criminal child endangerment where twins were born addicted to heroin
after mother used drug throughout pregnancy and failed to seek prenatal care despite warning
of fetal endangerment); State v. Osmus, 73 Wyo. 183, 200-02, 276 P.2d 469, 474-75 (1954)
(setting aside manslaughter conviction resting on maternal failure to obtain medical care dur-
ing pregnancy or delivery). But see State v. Shepard, 255 Iowa 1218, 1235-36, 124 N.W.2d
712, 722 (1964) (affirming second degree murder conviction for mother's malicious failure to
provide medical care for newborn). See generally Annot., 100 A.L.R.2D 483 (1965).
It would be difficult and unwise to impose criminal liability upon a pregnant woman
merely because she acts in ways potentially harmful to fetal health. Criminal liability should
be imposed only when a requirement for knowing and malicious harmful intent is met. At
least one court recognized the danger here when it stated, "Children are born of unattended
mothers on trains, in taxis, and in other out of the way places, and we fear to open up a field
for unjust prosecutions of actually innocent women." State v. Osmus, 73 Wyo. 183, 201, 276
P.2d 469, 475 (1954).
Theoretically, a live-born child could sue its mother for prenatal tortious conduct. In
such a suit, "the litigating child's mother would bear the same liability for injurious, negligent
conduct as would a third person." Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 400, 301 N.W.2d
869, 870 (1981). Apart from Grodin, there is no reported case in which a child was permitted
to maintain a suit against its mother for failing to undergo medical treatment that could have
benefitted the fetus. Moreover, suits of this nature may be barred by parental immunity. See
generally Annot., 6 A.L.R.4TH 1066 (1981) (discussing parents' liability for injury to child);
Note, Parental Liability for Prenatal Injury, 14 COLUM. J.L. & SOc. PROBS. 47 (1978); Note,
Court-Ordered Surgery for the Protection of a Viable Fetus-Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding
County Hospital Authority, 5 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 125 (1982). While a live-born child may
have a right to bring a negligence action against its mother for prenatal injury, it does not
necessarily follow that a fetus has a right to force its mother to accept treatment against her
will and in derogation of her rights to privacy and bodily integrity.
148. Lenow, supra note 105, at 5.
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care to a person who was not in existence at the time of his conduct.
Second, causation between conduct and injury was too difficult to
prove.149 At present, the majority rule followed in thirty-one states and
the District of Columbia recognizes a cause of action for wrongful death
when a viable fetus is stillborn as a result of a wrongful act.150 A minor-
ity of states allow such an action only if the fetus is live-born. 151 The
Arizona Supreme Court has explained the majority view:
The majority rule... acknowledges that the common law has evolved
to the point that the word "person" [as found in a wrongful death
statute] does usually include a fetus capable of extrauterine life....
The majority finds no logic in the premise that if the viable infant dies
immediately before birth it is not a "person" but that if it dies immedi-
ately after birth it is a "person." 152
149. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 62, at 367.
150. The court in Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 371, 38 N.W.2d 838, 841 (1949),
was the first to allow an action for the death of a stillborn, viable fetus. The 30 other jurisdic-
tions to recognize such an action are: Simmons v. Howard Univ., 323 F. Supp. 529, 529
(D.D.C. 1971); Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 97, 300 So. 2d 354, 355 (1974);
Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 362, 224 A.2d 406, 408 (1966); Worgan v. Greggo
& Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del. 258, 259, 128 A.2d 557, 558 (1956); Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App.
712, 716-17, 87 S.E.2d 100, 103 (1955); Volk v. Baldazo, 103 Idaho 570, 571, 651 P.2d 11, 13
(1982); Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 III. 2d 368, 374, 304 N.E.2d 88, 91 (1973); Britt v.
Sears, 150 Ind. App. 487, 498, 277 N.E.2d 20, 27 (1971); Dunn v. Rose Way, Inc., 333 N.W.2d
830, 831 (Iowa 1983); Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 146-47, 368 P.2d 1, 3 (1962); Mitchell v.
Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901, 906 (Ky. 1955); State ex rel. Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 183,
198 A.2d 71, 73 (1964); Mone v. Greyhound Lines, 368 Mass. 354, 361, 331 N.E.2d 916, 920
(1975); O'Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 133, 188 N.W.2d 785, 785-86 (1971); Rainey v. Horn,
221 Miss. 269, 283, 72 So. 2d 434, 439-40 (1954); O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904, 911
(Mo. 1983); White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 534-38, 458 P.2d 617, 621-24 (1969); Poliquin v.
MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 107, 132 A.2d 249, 251 (1957); Salazar v. St. Vincent Hosp., 95
N.M. 150, 153-54, 619 P.2d 826, 830 (1980); Hopkins v. McBane, 359 N.W.2d 862, 865 (N.D.
1984); Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 434-35, 167 N.E.2d 106, 108 (1959); Evans v.
Olson, 550 P.2d 924, 928 (Okla. 1976); Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 268 Or. 258, 263-67, 518
P.2d 636, 637-40 (1974) (en banc); Presley v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 188-89, 365 A.2d
748, 753-54 (1976); Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 614, 138 S.E.2d 42, 44-45 (1964);
Nelson v. Peterson, 542 P.2d 1075, 1077-78 (Utah 1975); Vaillancourt v. Medical Center
Hosp., 139 Vt. 138, 141, 425 A.2d 92, 94 (1980); Moen v. Hanson, 85 Wash. 2d 597, 598, 537
P.2d 266, 266 (1975) (en banc); Baldwin v. Butcher, 155 W. Va. 431, 441-42, 184 S.E.2d 428,
436 (1971); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 22, 148 N.W.2d 107, 112
(1967).
151. Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 580, 565 P.2d 122, 132-33, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97,
107-08 (1977) (en banc); Hernandez v. Garwood, 390 So. 2d 357, 358-59 (Fla. 1980); Egbert v.
Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573, 573, 260 N.W.2d 480, 481 (1977); Grafv. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 311, 204
A.2d 140, 145 (1964); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 485, 248 N.E.2d 901, 905, 301
N.Y.S.2d 65, 70 (1969); Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 400, 146 S.E.2d 425, 431 (1966)
(dictum); Scott v. Kopp, 494 Pa. 487, 488, 431 A.2d 959, 960 (1981); Hogan v. McDaniel, 204
Tenn. 235, 243-45, 319 S.W.2d 221, 224-25 (1958); Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 210 Va. 138,
142, 169 S.E.2d 440, 442 (1969); see Annot., 15 A.L.R.3D 992 (1967).
152. Summerfield v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 467, 477, 698 P.2d 712, 722 (1985) (en
banc).
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The United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade implied that its hold-
ing was not inconsistent with the majority rule 153 because of its view of
the purpose of wrongful death actions involving a fetus. Wade character-
ized the aim of wrongful death actions for prenatal injuries as "vindi-
cat[ing] the parents' interest [rather than the fetus', which is] consistent
with the view that the fetus, at most, represents only the potentiality of
life,"' 154 and is not a person in the whole sense.
Based on the law of property, crimes, and torts, several conclusions
can be drawn about the fetus. First, and most important, a fetus is not a
person under the law. 15 5 Nonetheless, the law undeniably recognizes
that the fetus has certain rights, such as inheritance, and is entitled to
certain protections, such as a right of recovery, if born alive, for prenatal
injury. 156 Yet the recognition of some legal protections does not trans-
form a fetus into a person with full legal rights, just as the limited legal
protections extended to animals and human corpses do not transform
them into persons.157
Second, the legal status of the fetus is determined largely by the pur-
poses of the particular law in question, rather than by a particular philo-
sophical view of fetal "personhood." Accordingly, the legal capacity of
an unborn fetus, if born alive, to inherit property is better understood as
a way to fulfill the intentions of the testator, a goal of inheritance law,
than as recognition of fetal personhood. Similarly, treatment of the un-
born by the common law of crimes "reflects a judgment that the society
of the time considered the killing of a fetus to be less blameworthy than
the killing of a man, and the killing of a fetus that had not yet displayed a
separate personality within the mother to be less blameworthy than the
killing of one which had."' 158 Modern society has made similar judg-
ments about the significance of killing a fetus. A fetus usually cannot be
153. Wade, 410 U.S. at 161-62.
154. Id. at 162.
155. Glantz, supra note 137, at 116; see White, supra note 127, at 129-30.
156. "For some purposes, the fetus is a person. For some, it is not. The stage at which it
is granted personhood varies from one area of law to another." Baron, "If You Prick Us, Do
We Not Bleed?": Of Shylock, Fetuses, and the Concept of Person in the Law, I 1 LAW MED. &
HEALTH CARE 52, 55 (1983). It seems more accurate to say that the law does not recognize
fetuses as persons but does grant them certain protections than to say that for some legal
purposes it is a person and for other purposes it is not.
157. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7052 (West 1982) (mutilating, disinter-
ring, or removing from the place of interment any human remains is a crime); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 597 (West 1982) (making cruelty to animals a crime); Id. § 642 (making theft of any
article of value from a dead human body a crime). It is implausible to claim that these protec-
tions make animals or human corpses "persons."
158. Baron, supra note 156, at 55-56.
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the victim of a homicide unless it is born alive.159 In jurisdictions in
which it is a criminal act to kill a fetus, the punishment is less than that
for killing a live-born person. 160 In some states, if the mother aids in or
consents to the killing, no murder is committed.161 In the context of
tortious conduct, the law attempts to compensate the innocent victims of
injury. To serve this purpose, it is logical to allow a live-born fetus to
recover damages for prenatal tortious injuries, or to allow the parents to
recover if deprived of a child they wanted.
In short, the variable legal treatment of a fetus is explained and jus-
tified by the particular social policies underlying different areas of law.' 62
A corporation receives similar treatment; it is a "person" within the
meaning of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, but
not a "person" for purposes of the fifth amendment's prohibition against
self-incrimination. 163 Similarly, a fetus may or may not possess legal
protections, depending on the legal context and the social policies at
stake. Consequently, despite appearances, the inconsistency in the legal
treatment of a fetus is not pernicious or arbitrary; it simply reflects social
values and policies taken into account by lawmakers. 164
The Constitutional Status of the Fetus and the State's Interest in the Fetus
The Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade 165 is the fundamental
source of the law governing not only the constitutional status of the fetus,
but also the scope and limits of the state's interests in the fetus and the
power of the state to intervene in a woman's choice to terminate her
pregnancy. In Wade, the Court stated "that the word 'person,' as used in
the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn." 66 Following
Wade, some lower federal courts held that a fetus is not a person with
159. See supra notes 106-27 & accompanying text.
160. See, eg., State v. Willis, 457 So. 2d 959, 960 (Miss. 1984) (The killing of a mother
with malice aforethought is murder, and the resulting fetal death is manslaughter.).
161. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a)(3) (West Supp. 1986).
162. Baron, supra note 156, at 55.
163. Id. at 54; see, e.g., Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 88-90 (1974) (corporation not
a person under fifth amendment); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 522 (1898) (corporation a
person for purposes of fourteenth amendment). Later in the twentieth century, the Court
granted due process protection to the liberty interest of corporations. See, e.g., First Nat'l
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767 (1978) (freedom of speech); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 428-29 (1963) (freedom of association); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233,
244 (1936) (freedom of the press).
164. Baron, supra note 156, at 53-56.
165. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
166. Id. at 158. The reason for so holding is that the contrary result might deny altogether
the right of a pregnant woman to take her fetus' life by aborting it. "If this suggestion of
personhood [for the fetus under the fourteenth amendment] is established, [the mother's] case,
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standing to sue for deprivation of constitutional rights, privileges, and
immunities or for federal civil rights violations. 67 One such federal dis-
trict court declared that, under Wade, "fetal life has no constitutional
rights or protection."' 1 68 On the other hand, Wade provides that a preg-
nant woman possesses a "right of privacy" that is "broad enough to en-
compass [her] decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.' ' 69
Although fundamental, this right is not absolute and unqualified and is
limited by certain state interests.
70
Despite its conclusion that a fetus is not a person for purposes of the
fourteenth amendment, the Court in Wade held that the state nonethe-
less has an "important and legitimate interest in protecting the potential-
ity of human life" that is separate and distinct from the state's interest in
preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman.' 7' These
two state interests become "compelling" at different points during preg-
nancy: the latter at the end of the first trimester, at which point maternal
mortality in abortion may exceed that in normal childbirth, and the for-
mer at the end of the second trimester, at which point the fetus is pre-
sumed capable of "meaningful life" outside the womb. 172
Consequently, even though the fetus is not a person under the four-
teenth amendment and has only the "potential" for human life, the Con-
stitution permits a state to regulate and even forbid abortions after the
fetus becomes presumptively viable-except when abortion is "necessary
of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life is then guaranteed specifically by the Amend-
ment." Id. at 156-57.
167. See, e.g., Harman v. Daniels, 525 F. Supp. 798, 800-01 (W.D. Va. 1981) (fetus not a
person within fourteenth amendment); Poole v. Endsley, 371 F. Supp. 1379, 1382 (N.D. Fla.
1974) (fetus not a person within fourteenth amendment), aff'd in part mem., 516 F.2d 898 (5th
Cir. 1975); McGarvey v. Magee-Womens Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 751, 754 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (de-
ferring question to legislature), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973). Contra Douglas v. Town
of Hartford, 542 F. Supp. 1267, 1270 (D. Conn. 1982) (citing expansion of state law rights of
viable fetus).
168. Harman v. Daniels, 525 F. Supp. 798, 800 (W.D. Va. 1981).
169. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153.
170. Id. at 162-63.
171. Id. at 162.
172. The Court stated:
With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential life, the
-'compelling" point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably has
the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb. State regulation protec-
tive of fetal life after viability thus has both logical and biological justifications. If the
State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to pro-
scribe abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or
health of the mother.
Id. at 163-64.
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to preserve the life or health of the mother." 17 3
Wade's statement about the compelling interest of the state in pro-
tecting fetal life at the point of viability has been cited frequently as au-
thority for compelling a pregnant woman to undergo medical treatment
for the sake of her fetus. For example, the Georgia Supreme Court relied
in part on Wade when it upheld a trial court's order compelling a preg-
nant woman to submit, despite religious objections, to a Cesarean section
to save the life of the fetus.174 This case, then, appears to reflect a judi-
cial readiness to construe Wade as authorizing forced medical treatment
to protect the potential life of a viable fetus. Commentators also have
relied upon Wade .to buttress arguments in favor of state intervention to
protect the fetus. Professor Myers favors an expansive interpretation of
Wade's language regarding the state's interest in protecting potential life:
While the fetus is not a 'person' entitled to fourteenth amendment pro-
tection, Wade makes clear that the state has substantial authority to
protect fetal life.
The state's interest in viable fetal life permits it to forbid abortion,
an act designed to extinguish life. It follows from this that the state is
empowered to proscribe other acts calculated or likely to lead to the
same result. Furthermore, since the interest in preservation of fetal life
authorizes intervention to prevent destructive acts, it should also au-
thorize limited compulsion of action which is necessary to preserve
fetal life. Since a failure to act can as surely lead to frustration of the
state's interest as an affirmative act, the underlying state interest must
reach both cases.17 5
Professor Robertson has noted that if a state has prohibited abortions
after viability pursuant to Wade, a woman carrying a fetus with a con-
genital defect "might be required to have the in utero surgery [to correct
the defect], or be subject to criminal and civil penalties for not employing
a therapy that would prevent the birth of a dead or handicapped
child." 176
173. Id.
174. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 89, 274 S.E.2d 457,
460 (1981) (per curiam) (citing Wade, 410 U.S. 113; Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky.
1969); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537
(per curiam), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964)). "[T]he state's compelling interest in preserv-
ing the life of this fetus is beyond dispute." Jefferson, 247 Ga. at 91, 274 S.E.2d at 461 (Smith,
J., concurring) (citing Wade, 410 U.S. 113). "The Supreme Court has recognized that the state
has an interest in protecting the lives of unborn, viable children [in] Roe v. Wade .. " Jeffer-
son, 247 Ga. at 90, 274 S.E.2d at 460 (Hill, Presiding J., concurring).
175. Myers, supra note 4, at 18 (footnotes omitted).
176. Robertson, supra note 7, at 350 (footnote omitted). In a footnote to this statement,
Professor Robertson asserts, with no citation to authority or further analysis, that if such a
woman refused the surgery and the fetus died, "she could be prosecuted under state feticide or
abortion laws." Id. at 350 n.82.
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The fallacy in this reliance on Wade is both fundamental and seri-
ous. While it is true that Wade recognized the state's compelling interest
in protecting fetal life by banning abortion after viability, Wade also
placed a critical limit on the exercise of this interest: "[The state] may go
so far as to proscribe abortion during [the third trimester], except when it
is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.' ' 177 As a matter of
constitutional law, then, the state's interest in protecting fetal life is not
so compelling as to be absolute. Rather, this interest is limited by the
mother's right of privacy and by her own interests in the preservation of
her own life and health. In other words, the state lacks the constitutional
power to prohibit abortion of a viable fetus if abortion is "necessary to
preserve [maternal] life or health."' 178 Consequently, it is simply wrong
to assert that Wade grants the state unqualified authority to protect the
fetus or an unlimited power to prohibit abortions after viability.
Wade itself does not fully explain this limitation on the state's inter-
est in fetal life and on its ability to ban post-viability abortions. How-
ever, in United States v. Vuitch,179 the Court rejected a vagueness
challenge to a statutory requirement that an abortion must be "necessary
177. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163-64 (emphasis added); see Hollis v. Commonwealth, 652
S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983) (The killing of a viable fetus does not support a murder conviction
unless the child dies after live birth.). The Hollis court stated:
Viewed in the context of Roe, Kentucky has a "compelling" interest in the life of the
fetus when it reaches the stage of viability sufficient to legislate legal sanctions pun-
ishing those who destroy it, subject to the limitations that such sanctions shall not
apply where the life or the health of the mother is involved.
Id. at 63.
178. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163-64. The number of post-viability abortions purportedly per-
formed for the preservation of the mother's life or health as sanctioned by Wade is unknown.
Statistics from the Centers for Disease Control indicate that abortions in the latter stages of
pregnancy are rare: in 1980, less than one percent of the 1.6 million abortions performed
nationwide were done on women pregnant more than 21 weeks. N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1984, at
B4, col. 5. There are a number of possible reasons that physicians avoid either performing
abortions near or after viability or publicly discussing these abortions. First, the medical risks
to the mother increase substantially as the pregnancy advances. Rhoden, The New Neonatal
Dilemma: Live Births from Late Abortions, 72 GEO. L.J. 1451, 1455 (1984). Second, although
other methods of abortion commonly used near the point of viability are highly feticidal, the
administration of the abortifacient prostaglandin can result in live births that raise a host of
agonizing legal and ethical questions about treating the abortus. Id. at 1454-61, 1466-90; N.Y.
Times, Feb. 15, 1984, at B4, col. 1. Third, and perhaps of more significance, physicians are
understandably reluctant to risk criminal prosecution for performing a post-viability abortion.
This reluctance is particularly understandable given the lack of clarity about when such an
abortion may be "necessary" to preserve the health of the mother. Cf. Commonwealth v.
Edelin, 371 Mass. 497, 510-17, 359 N.E.2d 4, 11-14 (1976) (difficult factual issues of viability
and live birth). In any event, physicians in fact do often avoid performing abortions near the
point of viability. N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1984, at B4, col. 1.
179. 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
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for the preservation of the mother's life or health." 180 Similarly, in Doe
v. Bolton,181 the companion case to Wade, the Court did not find uncon-
stitutionally vague a statutory requirement that a physician determine on
the basis of his "best clinical judgment" that an abortion is "neces-
sary." 182 According to a later case, both of these challenges failed be-
cause these statutory requirements had been "interpreted to allow the
physician to make his determination in the light of all attendant circum-
stances-psychological and emotional as well as physical-that might be
relevant to the well-being of the [mother]." 18 3 In short, the state must
leave the physician free to analyze a broad range of factors when deter-
mining whether an abortion during the third trimester is "necessary to
preserve the life or health of the mother." As the Third Circuit has
noted: "It is clear from the Supreme Court cases that 'health' is to be
broadly defined." 184
Colautti v. Franklin 185 further illuminates the limits on the state's
ability to regulate abortions after viability. There, the Court found sec-
tion 5(a) of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act186 unconstitutionally
vague.1 87 Section 5(a) required a physician performing an abortion to
adopt the abortion technique providing "the best opportunity for the fe-
tus to be aborted alive so long as a different technique would not be nec-
essary in order to preserve the life or health of the mother." 188 The
Court criticized this portion of the statute because it did not "clearly
specify.., that the woman's life and health must always prevail over the
fetus' life and health when they conflict." 189 The Court disapproved of
the use of the word "necessary" in the statute because it "suggest[ed]
that a particular [abortion] technique must be indispensable to the wo-
man's life or health-not merely desirable-before it may be
adopted."' 190 Citing Vuitch and Bolton, the Court also noted that the
statute did not imply "that all factors relevant to the welfare of the wo-
180. Id. at 71-72.
181. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
182. Id. at 191-92.
183. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 394 (1979). Colautti expressly noted that the
Court in Bolton "found it critical" that the physician's best clinical judgment "may be exer-
cised in the light of all factors-physicial, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's
age-relevant to the well-being of the patient." Id. at 387-88 (citing Bolton, 410 U.S. at 192).
184. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283,
299 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986).
185. 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
186. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6605(a) (Purdon 1977).
187. Colautti, 439 U.S. at 394.
188. See supra note 186.
189. Colautti, 439 U.S. at 400 (emphasis added).
190. Id.
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man may be taken into account by the physician in making his decision"
regarding abortion technique.' 9' Based upon this analysis, the Court
concluded:
Consequently, it is uncertain whether the statute permits the physician
to consider his duty to the patient to be paramount to his duty to the
fetus, or whether it requires the physician to make a "trade-off' between
the woman's health and additional percentage points of fetal survival.
Serious ethical and constitutional difficulties, that we do not address,
lurk behind this ambiguity. We hold only that where conflicting duties
of this magnitude are involved, the State, at the least, must proceed
with greater precision before it may subject a physician to possible
criminal sanctions. 192
Thus, Colautti suggested that the state is constitutionally barred from
utilizing the criminal law to require a physician performing an abortion
to place the interests of the fetus above those of the mother. The Colautti
Court clearly stated that "the woman's life and health must always pre-
vail over the fetus' life and health when they conflict" as a matter of
constitutional law in the context of an abortion. 93
The Court in Colautti gave little attention to the "constitutional dif-
ficulties" '94 lurking in the Pennsylvania abortion statute that appeared to
require a physician to place the medical interests of the fetus above those
of the mother. However, subsequent challenges to the constitutionality
of the Pennsylvania abortion laws provided the federal courts with addi-
tional opportunities to resolve these difficulties. For example, in Ameri-
can College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Thornburgh,195 the Third
Circuit reviewed parts of Pennsylvania's amended Abortion Control
Act, 196 including section 3210(b), which required the use in post-viability
abortions of the method most likely to result in the fetus being "aborted
alive," unless that procedure would result in a "significantly greater" risk
to the mother. 197 Noting Colautti's holding that the former statute im-
permissibly required the physician to "make a 'trade-off' between the wo-
man's health and ...fetal survival," Thornburgh struck down section
3210(b) because it, "like the old [statute], failed to require that maternal
health be the paramount consideration."'19 8 Because it was not suscepti-
ble to a construction "that does not require the mother to bear an in-
191. Id.
192. Id. at 400-01 (emphasis added).
193. Id. at 400.
194. Id.
195. 737 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986).
196. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3201-3220 (Purdon 1983).
197. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d at 300 (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3210(b) (Purdon
1983)).
198. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d at 300 (emphasis added).
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creased medical risk to save her viable fetus," the court held section
3210(b) unconstitutional. 199
In sum, Wade, as clarified by Vuitch, Bolton, and Colautti, stands
for the proposition that a woman's constitutional right of privacy re-
quires a state to allow a physician to consider a wide range of factors
when determining whether an abortion of a viable fetus is necessary to
preserve maternal life or health. Underlying this rule is the assumption
that, incident to her right of privacy, a woman's interests in the preserva-
tion of her life and health are superior to the state's compelling interest in
preserving fetal life. Colautti and Thornburgh make this assumption ex-
plicit: a state is constitutionally required to frame its abortion laws so
that the woman's health is paramount over the fetus' survival. Even
though the state's interest in protecting fetal life becomes compelling at
viability, this interest is not sufficiently compelling under the Constitu-
tion to support a statutory requirement that the mother bear any in-
creased risk to her health in order to save her viable fetus.
Accordingly, it is mistaken to claim that Wade recognizes a state's
interest in a viable fetus that permits it to force a pregnant woman to
accept treatment for the sake of her fetus, at least when the treatment
poses risks to the mother that she would not otherwise face. In fact,
Wade and its progeny direct that the pregnant woman's interest in her
life and health "must always prevail" over that of the fetus when they
conflict in the abortion context. In light of these holdings, if these inter-
ests directly conflict in a nonabortion context that implicates a woman's
constitutional right of privacy, the state would be constitutionally bound
to place the woman's life and health above that of the fetus. In fact, as
discussed below, a woman's constitutional right to privacy as well as
other fundamental and important legal rights are at stake when she is
faced with the prospect of state-compelled medical treatment for the sake
of the fetus.
The Legal Rights of the Pregnant Woman
The common law has long recognized that each individual has the
right to control his own person and a concomitant right to be free from
nonconsensual invasions of bodily integrity. At ancient common law, the
action of trespass was criminal in character and "directed at serious and
forcible breaches of the King's peace."'200 Later, courts began awarding
damages in trespass to injured plaintiffs who did not need to prove either
199. Id.
200. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 62, at 29.
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actual damage or fault on the part of the defendant since "the invasion of
the plaintiffs rights was regarded as a tort in itself."' 20 ' Later, the tort of
battery was recognized as the means of vindicating the interest in free-
dom from intentional and unpermitted bodily contact. Like the ancient
action for trespass, "[p]roof of the technical invasion of the integrity of
the plaintiff's person by even an entirely harmless, but offensive, contact
entitle[d] the plaintiff to vindication of [his] legal right by an award of
nominal damages. '20 2
The rights to control one's own person and to be free from un-
wanted bodily invasions are fundamental to the structure of our political
and social system. "Under a free government, at least, the free citizen's
first and greatest right, which underlies all others-the right to the invio-
lability of his person; in other words the right to himself-is subject to
universal acquiescence .. ".. 203 Almost one hundred years ago, the
Supreme Court acknowledged the fundamental nature and importance of
these rights:
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and
control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of
others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law. As well
said by Judge Cooley, "The right to one's person may be said to be a
right of complete immunity: to be let alone."'20 4
This language is not hyperbole. Our political and social system is
founded upon the premises that the individual should have a great deal of
control over his person and that society should protect individuals from
unwanted physical assaults. The right to control one's body is, of course,
like all rights, subject to limitation by certain state interests.20 5
The common-law right to bodily integrity underlies the doctrine of
informed consent to medical treatment. At common law, it was recog-
nized that every person "of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what should be done with his own body; and a surgeon who
201. Id. at 30.
202. Id. at 40.
203. Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 268, 104 N.W. 12, 14 (1905), overruled on other
grounds, Genzel v. Halvorson, 248 Minn. 527, 80 N.W.2d 854 (1957).
204. Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). Wade refers to Botsford as the
first in a line of cases in which "the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a
guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution." Wade, 410
U.S. at 152.
205. "We recognize that under certain circumstances the common-law right [to bodily
integrity] may have to yield to superior State interests .... The State has a legitimate interest
in protecting the lives of its citizens. It may require that they submit to medical procedures in
order to eliminate a health threat to the community." In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 377, 420
N.E.2d 64, 71, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 273, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
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performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault,
for which he is liable in damages. ' 20 6 Until modern times, however,
there was no requirement that the physician inform the patient about the
nature, risks, and consequences of the treatment for which his consent
must be sought. Now, the patient must give an informed consent and so
has the right to receive information about the proffered- treatment, its
risks and benefits, and alternatives to enable the patient to make a mean-
ingful choice.20 7
The United States Constitution, as well as the common law, protects
the individual's right to bodily integrity. A number of courts have ex-
pressly recognized that the constitutional right of privacy protects the
individual's bodily integrity. For example, in Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 20 8 the Massachusetts Supreme Ju-
dicial Court stated:
Of even broader import [than the common law regarding bodily
integrity], but arising from the same regard for human dignity and self-
determination, is the unwritten constitutional right of privacy .... As
this constitutional guaranty reaches out to protect the freedom of a
woman to terminate her pregnancy under certain conditions.. . , so it
encompasses the right of a patient to preserve his or her right to pri-
vacy against unwanted infringements of bodily integrity in appropriate
circumstances. 209
The individual can "choose to reject, or refuse to consent to, intrusions of
206. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-130, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914), overruled on other grounds, People v. Marsellus, 2 N.Y.2d 653, 143 N.E.2d 1, 163
N.Y.S.2d 1 (1957). There is an exception to this rule in cases of emergency when the patient is
unconscious and it is necessary to administer treatment before the patient can consent. Id. at
130, 105 N.E. at 93.
207. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514
(1972).
208. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
209. Id. at 739, 370 N.E.2d at 424 (citations omitted); see also Bartling v. Superior Court,
163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984) (right of privacy guaranteed by the California
Constitution, as well as by the United States Constitution); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (terminally ill competent adult patient has constitutional right to
refuse or discontinue medical treatment), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); In re Quinlan, 70
N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (decision to terminate vegetative existence by natural forces was valua-
ble incident of right to privacy and could be asserted on patient's behalf by her guardian), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Not surprisingly, in rejecting the notion that the right of privacy
was absolute, the Wade Court noted that
it is not clear to us that the claim asserted by some amici that one has an unlimited
right to do with one's body as one pleases bears a close relationship to the right of
privacy previously articulated in the Court's decisions. The Court has refused to
recognize an unlimited right of this kind in the past.
410 U.S. at 154 (citing Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)) (sterilization); Jacobson v. Massa-
chusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (vaccination).
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his bodily integrity," such as medical treatment.2 1 0 Additionally, the
fourteenth amendment protects the "right to be free from ... unjustified
intrusions on personal security."'2 1  Furthermore, the fourth amendment
protects "the individual's legitimate expectations that in certain places
and at certain times he has 'the right to be let alone-the most compre-
hensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.' "212 Ac-
cordingly, the function of the fourth amendment "is to protect personal
privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State.
2 1 3
All of these constitutional protections for the right to bodily integ-
rity have their limits. The right of privacy as exercised in a refusal of
medical treatment may give way to state interests in the preservation of
life, the prevention of suicide, the protection of innocent third parties,
and maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession. 21 4 The
liberty interests secured by the fourteenth amendment can be reasonably
restricted for the common good.2 15 The community's interests in secur-
ing evidence of crime and in fairly and accurately determining guilt or
innocence are of "great importance" and may outweigh the individual's
"personal privacy and bodily integrity. ' 21 6
A competent pregnant woman who refuses treatment that may be
medically necessary to preserve the life or health of the fetus she carries
has a strong personal interest in her bodily integrity. She has the same
common-law and constitutional rights as a nonpregnant competent wo-
210. Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225
(1984).
211. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977) (corporal punishment of public school
children).
212. Winston v. Lee, 105 S. Ct. 1611, 1615-16 (1985) (quoting Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
213. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (extraction of blood from drunk
driving suspect against his will not a violation of fourth amendment when facts establish prob-
able cause and there was no time to secure a search warrant); cf. Winston v. Lee, 105 S. Ct.
1611, 1615-16 (1985) (surgical removal of bullet from suspect's chest violated his fourth
amendment rights).
214. Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225
(1984); Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 741, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
215. The Supreme Court has stated:
[T]he liberty secured by the Constitution .. .does not import an absolute right in
each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly free from re-
straint .... "The possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject to such reason-
able conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority ... essential to safety,
health, peace, good order and morals of the community. Even liberty itself, the
greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's will."
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26-27 (1905) (quoting Crowley v. Christensen, 137
U.S. 86, 89 (1890)).
216. Winston v. Lee, 105 S. Ct. 1611, 1617-18 (1985).
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man. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a more direct intrusion on a wo-
man's personal privacy and bodily integrity than to be forced to undergo
medical treatment against her will. While the legal rights of the pregnant
woman to maintain her bodily integrity by refusing treatment are strong,
the question remains whether they are strong enough to withstand chal-
lenge when the treatment in question affects the life or health of her fetus.
The State, the Individual, and the Constitution: Competing
Interests
The only possible justification for a court order requiring a direct
intrusion into a woman's body against her will would be a court's judg-
ment that the interests of the fetus outweigh the interests of the pregnant
woman. The precedential value of Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County
Hospital Authority217 and other unreported cases notwithstanding, the
law clearly does not, nor should it, support such a judgment.
First, Roe v. Wade218 held that a fetus is not a "person" for pur-
poses of the fourteenth amendment.219 While this statement does not
necessarily imply that the fetus is a nonperson in all other legal con-
texts,220 it does deny fetuses basic constitutional protection of life, lib-
erty, and property. Despite the potential detriment to the fetus resulting
from the pregnant woman's choice to refuse medical treatment, that
choice should prevail. Her status under the Constitution is superior and
her "personhood" is free from doubt, while the fetus' constitutional sta-
tus is inferior and its legal status as a person is uncertain and amorphous.
Second, and more important, Wade, Colautti,22' and Thornburgh222
deny the state a compelling interest in the protection of fetal life when
the fetus' and mother's interests in life and health conflict in the context
of abortion.223 It surely follows that the state is constitutionally barred
from forcing the mother to undergo medical treatment for the sake of the
217. 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981); see also Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial
Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (per curiam), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
218. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
219. Id. at 158.
220. See Myers, supra note 4, at 14-17.
221. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979). See supra notes 184-93 & accompanying
text.
222. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283 (3d
Cir. 1984), aff'd 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986). See supra notes 194-98 & accompanying text.
223. We recognize that this constitutional argument based on Wade, Colautti, and.Thorn-
burgh has an obvious limitation in that it would not apply if medical treatment would put the
mother at less risk of physical harm than foregoing the recommended treatment or if the treat-
ment put her at no risk in any event. Consequently, this Article's constitutional argument
would not necessarily preclude the state from forcing the mother to accept treatment that
May 1986]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
fetus if that treatment endangers her life or health in any way.224 As the
Thornburgh court stated, "maternal health must be the paramount con-
sideration. '22 5 Even if the treatment does not put the woman's life or
health at risk, however, the other arguments against compelled treatment
based upon the value of maintaining the woman's bodily integrity and
the uncertain legal and ethical status of the fetus would still apply.226
Third, a pregnant woman's right to bodily integrity is too funda-
mental to be pushed aside by a judicial order for the sake of a fetus who
is, at best, a quasi-person under the law. 227 The importance of bodily
integrity to our political and social value system is not a matter of rheto-
ric; it is part of the foundation of a free society that respects the individ-
ual. 228 In fact, no reported appellate case has upheld a lower court's
either was of no risk to her or put her at less risk than refusing. Nonetheless, all of the other
arguments against compelling treatment would still apply.
224. Because almost all medical interventions that could benefit the fetus entail at least
some risk to the mother's life and health, the state cannot constitutionally force the mother to
be the subject of those interventions. The medical risks to the mother range from death (due to
anesthesia, blood loss, or infection) to pain and disfigurement. However, in some situations,
discussed supra text accompanying notes 23-25, 28-29, the treatment poses truly negligible
medical risk to the mother yet promises to benefit the fetus greatly.
225. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d at 300.
226. In In re Application of Jamaica Hosp., 128 Misc. 2d 1006, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1985), the court ordered a competent adult woman who was 18 weeks pregnant and
who was suffering from internal bleeding to accept blood transfusions for the sake of her previ-
able fetus. The patient, a Jehovah's Witness, had refused the blood transfusions on religious
grounds. Citing Wade, the court held that "the State has a highly significant interest in pro-
tecting the life of a mid-term fetus, which outweighs the patient's right to refuse a blood trans-
fusion on religious grounds." Id. at 1008, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 899. As discussed above, Wade
does not stand for the proposition that the state has an interest in the previable fetus that can
outweigh the mother's right of privacy and right to bodily integrity. Because the mother here
could have legally aborted the fetus under Wade, it is exceedingly difficult to understand how
Wade can grant the state a "highly significant interest" in the fetus that outweighs the
mother's constitutional and common-law rights. Significantly, the New York court did not
even mention the mother's constitutional right to privacy and did not hold an adversary hear-
ing on the application.
227. One commentator has stated:
Neither arguments for potentiality nor interests in human life as such can give suffi-
cient support for the status of the fetus as a moral object, much less as a moral
subject, to justify restricting the free choice of women in [obtaining abortions]. Po-
tential persons have only potential rights, and simply being human does not confer
sufficient moral standing to constrain the freedom of women seeking abortions.
Engelhardt, Introduction to ABORTION AND THE STATUS OF THE FETUS at xxiii (W.
Bondeson, H. Engelhardt, Jr., S. Spicker & D. Winship eds. 1983). Similarly, the fetus does
not have sufficient moral standing to constrain the freedom of women who refuse medical
treatment or choose to live in a manner that might harm their fetuses.
228. See, e.g., Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 28, 252 N.Y.S. 2d 705, 706 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1962) ("[I]t is the [competent adult] individual who is the subject of a medical decision
who has the final say and.., this must necessarily be so in a system of government which gives
the greatest possible protection to the individual in the furtherance of his own desires.").
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order that actually compelled a conscious, competent adult other than a
prisoner to accept medical treatment against his will.229 As the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court has observed:
The constitutional right to privacy... is an expression of the sanctity
of individual free choice and self-determination as fundamental con-
stituents of life. The value of life as so perceived is lessened not by a
decision to refuse treatment, but by the failure to allow a competent
human being the right of choice.230
The value of a pregnant woman's life and dignity is certainly diminished
if she is forced by a court to give up her right to decide what is to be done
to her own body.
Furthermore, the law traditionally has strongly disfavored compel-
229. In Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457
(1981), the trial court's order was never enforced, and Mrs. Jefferson was not actually forced to
undergo the Cesarean section. In fact, a few days after the Georgia Supreme Court denied a
stay of the trial court's order, Mrs. Jefferson uneventfully delivered a healthy baby without
surgical intervention. Annas, supra note 4, at 16. The eight-month pregnant woman in Ra-
leigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. de-
nied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964), had left the hospital against medical advice before the New Jersey
Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order upholding her refusal of a blood transfusion.
Id. at 423, 201 A.2d at 538. Other cases commonly cited as examples of compelled treatment
of competent adults, Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331
F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964), and John F. Kennedy Memorial
Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971), both involved adults who were incompe-
tent at the critical moment when treatment was necessary to preserve their lives. In Commis-
sioner of Correction v. Myers, 379 Mass..255, 399 N.E.2d 452 (1979), the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court held that a competent prisoner suffering from kidney disease could be
compelled by the state to submit to hemodialysis and to receive medications despite his refusal
of such treatment, because the state's interest in upholding orderly prison administration out-
weighed the prisoner's interests. Id. at 266, 399 N.E.2d at 458. In In re Joel Caulk, 125 N.H.
226, 480 A.2d 93 (1984), the Supreme Court of New Hampshire ruled that a competent pris-
oner intentionally starving himself to death could be force-fed because the state's interest in
maintaining an effective criminal justice system and in preserving life outweighed the pris-
oner's right to privacy. Id. at 232, 480 A.2d at 97. However, in Zant v. Prevatte, 248 Ga. 832,
286 S.E.2d 715 (1982), the Georgia Supreme Court reached the opposite result. While in
custody, Prevatte stopped eating, and the state sought an order requiring him to undergo a
medical exam and to be force-fed. After noting that the prisoner was not mentally incompe-
tent and had no dependents, the court ruled that he, "by virtue of his right of privacy, can
refuse to allow intrusions on his person, even though calculated to preserve his life. The State
has not shown such a compelling interest in preserving Prevatte's life, as would override his
right to refuse medical treatment." Id. at 834, 286 S.E.2d at 717.
There are, however, three recent trial court decisions compelling a competent adult to
receive blood transfusions despite her refusal on religious grounds. All involved Jehovah's
Witnesses. In re Application of Jamaica Hosp., 128 Misc. 2d 1006, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1985); In re Application of Winthrop Univ. Hosp., 128 Misc. 2d 804, 490 N.Y.S.2d
996 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d
670 (1971). For the various reasons set forth herein, these cases were wrongly decided and
should not be followed. See supra note 226, infra notes 275, 282.
230. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 742, 370
N.E.2d 417, 425 (1977).
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ling bodily intrusions on persons without their consent. 23' The courts,
nonetheless, have not held that the right to bodily integrity is absolute.
The state may, for example, legitimately require persons to undergo com-
pulsory vaccination for the sake of public health, 232 to be drafted into the
military for the protection of the nation,233 or to be subjected to
physicially invasive searches for evidence of criminal activity. 234 In addi-
tion, courts have ordered organs to be taken from incompetent persons
without their consent and transplanted into their siblings. 235
Nevertheless, the cases that permit certain kinds of compelled inva-
sions still recognize the high value our society places on the bodily integ-
rity of the individual. Although Schmerber v. California 236 recognized
that the state, without violating the fourth amendment, may have a phy-
sician extract a blood sample from a criminal suspect without his con-
sent, the Court also observed that the "integrity of the individual's
person is a cherished value of our society. ' 237 Similarly, in Winston v.
Lee,238 the Court observed that personal privacy and dignity are values
"basic to a free society ' 239 and can be of such magnitude that a com-
pelled surgical procedure on a suspect's body may be unreasonable and
in violation of the fourth amendment even if likely to produce evidence
of a crime.240
The courts have proceeded slowly and cautiously in authorizing
bodily intrusions by the state. Schmerber explicitly cautioned that its
231. See Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. Ri-v. 1569, 1583-88 (1979).
232. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (smallpox vaccination).
233. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
234. See, e.g., United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc)
(surgical removal of a bullet from a hospitalized suspect's arm, following full procedural safe-
guards, not an unreasonable search under the fourth amendment), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062
(1977).
235. Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (1972); Strunk v. Strunk, 445
S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969). Contra In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185 (La. Ct. App. 1973); Lausier
v. Pescinski, 67 Wis. 2d 4, 226 N.W.2d 180 (1975). The two cases permitting organ "dona-
tion" in the absence of the "donor's" consent, Strunk and Hart, can be readily and conclu-
sively distinguished as inapplicable to the issue of forcing pregnant woment to undergo
treatment. First, such compelled organ donation has been justified by a purported showing
that the incompetent would benefit from the "donation." Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 146-47. If
only in her own estimation, if not also in fact, a pregnant woman will not benefit from forced
treatment against her will. Second, the pregnant woman is actively opposing the treatment
being offered to her, while the incompetent is neither acquiescing to nor resisting the surgery
precisely because of his incompetence.
236. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
237. Id. at 772. The Court also based its result in part on its finding that "for most people
the [blood test] procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain." Id. at 771.
238. 105 S. Ct. 1611 (1985).
239. Id. at 1616 (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949)).
240. Winston, 105 S. Ct. at 1616.
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holding "that the consititution does not forbid the states minor intrusions
into an individual's body under stringently limited conditions in no way
indicates that it permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions under
other conditions."'241 Along similar lines, Winston required that the rea-
sonableness of surgical intrusions be determined on a case by case basis,
weighing the individual's interests in privacy and security against soci-
ety's interest in obtaining the evidence.242 Moreover, a number of courts
have refused to order compulsory surgery if it would endanger the life or
health of the suspect.2 43
In sum, the cases permitting the state to compel some bodily intru-
sions do not strongly support the forced treatment of pregnant women
for the sake of their fetuses. Most of the permitted intrusions are very
minor in nature, 244 intended to benefit society at large,2 45 or involve the
sui generis situation of a prisoner in state custody.2 46 In contrast, many
of the intrusions upon a pregnant woman's person or liberty thought nec-
essary to protect the fetus are neither minor in nature nor designed to
benefit society in any tangible manner, nor does her refusal of treatment
affect any significant state interests.
The importance of freedom of choice also is reflected in the vener-
able common-law principle that an individual is not ordinarily obligated
to volunteer aid to another who is in need of assistance, even if the failure
to act proves fatal to the imperiled person and the aid necessary to avert
the tragic outcome would have involved little inconvenience for the po-
tential rescuer. 247 This "Bad Samaritan" principle exists because the
common law highly values the individual's interests both in freedom
from physical invasion or involuntary physical activity and in freedom to
241. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772 (emphasis added).
242. Winston, 105 S. Ct. at 1616..
243. E.g., United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (agree-
ing with district court that a surgical operation to remove a second bullet imbedded in the
suspect's thigh would be unacceptable because the procedure might reduce the suspect's use of
his leg); Bowden v. State, 256 Ark. 820, 824, 510 S.W.2d 879, 881 (1974) (removal of bullet
near spine a "major intrusion" that would subject the suspect to trauma, pain, and "possible
risk of life" even if performed properly); Adams v. State, 260 Ind. 663, 299 N.E.2d 834 (1973)
(per se rule against surgery), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974); People v. Smith, 80 Misc. 2d
210, 362 N.Y.S.2d 909 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) (removal of bullet under muscles in chest wall a
major intrusion).
244. E.g., Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757 (blood sample); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S.
11 (1905) (smallpox vaccination); United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(removal of bullet lying superficially beneath skin did not involve any harm or risk from
surgery).
245. E.g., Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
246. See supra notes 228-29.
247. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 61, at 375.
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refuse to subordinate one's preferences and needs to those of another. 248
As Professor Regan rightly observed, "If this freedom is important, it is
as important for the pregnant woman as for anyone else."' 249 The Bad
Samaritan principle and the values upon which it rests further illuminate
why pregnant women should not be compelled to receive medical treat-
ment they do not want.
Assume that a four-year-old girl is suffering from kidney disease and
can no longer be maintained properly on chronic hemodialysis. Her
mother, a medically suitable organ donor, refuses to undergo the trans-
plantation surgery. Would a legal action by the daughter to compel her
mother to donate her kidney be successful? In all likelihood, no.2 5 0 The
end result of not compelling the donation-the death of a young child-
would be tragic. The mother's refusal to aid her child may well be mor-
ally indefensible to some. But any other outcome would be unprece-
dented in any court and would alter fundamentally the structure of our
society, based as it is on the freedom of the individual.
There is but one case that confronts the question of compelling a
competent adult to "donate" body tissue to another. In McFall v.
Shimp, 251 a thirty-nine-year-old man terminally ill with aplastic anemia
sought a state judicial order compelling his first cousin to undergo fur-
ther testing for compatibility of tissue and to "donate" bone marrow for
transplantation if sufficient compatibility were present. The transplanta-
tion procedure apparently offered the plaintiff at least some hope of sur-
248. See Regan, supra note 230, at 1569-79. The conclusions in this Article have been
heavily influenced by Regan's analysis of abortion as a problem in the law of "Samaritanism,"
that is, the law concerning obligations imposed on certain individuals to give aid to others.
Regan refers to the established principle that one does not have to volunteer aid as the "Bad
Samaritan" principle. Id. at 1572. This Article uses the same term.
249. Id. at 1578.
250. A number of commentators have referred recently to compulsory organ donation as
an example of a practice "clearly beyond the pale." See id. at 1585. This situation, in which it
would be highly unlikely for any judge to force a mother to donate a part of her body, also
demonstrates why the "special relationship" (here, parent-child) exception to the Bad Samari-
tan principle does not apply to the pregnant woman refusing treatment. See id. at 1593-98. If
the "special relationship" between parent and child does not justify compulsion of the mother
to donate body tissue to her daughter, it would not appear to justify compulsion of a pregnant
woman to undergo treatment for the sake of her fetus either. McFall v. Shimp, No. 78-17711
In Equity (C.P. Allegheny County, Pa. July 16, 1978), cited in Comment, Coerced Donation of
Body Tissue: Can We Live with McFall v. Shimp?, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 409, 409 n.1 (1979),
denies the existence of a duty to undergo invasive medical procedures to benefit a family mem-
ber. See infra notes 250-54 & accompanying text. One commentator, however, has stated that
Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969), arguably supports the existence of such a duty.
Mathieu, supra note 8, at 44.
251. No. 78-17711 (C.P. Allegheny County, Pa. July 16, 1978), cited in Comment, supra
note 250, at 409 n.1.
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vival, while the risk of harm to the unwilling donor was quite small. The
trial court refused to issue the order, finding no duty on the part of the
defendant to render assistance. In the court's view, the absence of such a
duty rested upon principles constituting the "very essence . . . of our
society. ' 25 2 Although the court opined that the refusal of the defendant
to assist his relative was morally questionable, it stated that legally forc-
ing him to submit to such a bodily intrusion "would change every con-
cept and principle upon which our society is founded. '253 The court
recognized the extraordinary significance of the relief sought and de-
clined to force the defendant to submit to the medical procedures:
For a society, which respects the right of one individual, to sink its
teeth into the jugular vein or neck of one of its members and suck from
it sustenance for another member, is revolting to our hard-wrought
concepts of jurisprudence. Forceable extraction of living body tissue
causes revulsion to the judicial mind. Such would raise the spectre of
the swastika and the Inquisition, reminiscent of the horrors this
portends.
254
The court also expressed concern about the effects of establishing a duty
to undergo bodily invasion for the benefit of another. To find such a duty
"would defeat the sanctity of the individual, and would impose a rule
which would know no limits, and one could not imagine where the line
would be drawn. '255
If our society will not compel someone to undergo a bodily invasion
such as organ or tissue transplantation for the benefit of another, how
can society view pregnant women refusing treatment any differently?
The basic values at stake are the same: the freedom to choose one's own
destiny and to maintain one's bodily integrity. These values should un-
derlie both our refusal to require someone to bind up the wounds of a
stranger who is bleeding to death 256 and our refusal to compel a compe-
tent pregnant woman to receive medical treatment against her will.
Compelled treatment cannot plausibly be justified by the need to save the
fetus' life; we do not legally compel others to save the lives of live-born
persons, even when the action required is much less physically burden-
some or invasive.257 In light of the fetus' dubious and unsettled legal and
252. McFall, No. 78-17711, slip op. at 2, quoted in Comment, supra note 249, at 413.
253. McFall, No. 78-17711, slip op. at 2, quoted in Comment, supra note 249, at 409.
254. McFall, No. 78-17711, slip op. at 2-3 (emphasis in original), quoted in Comment,
supra note 249, at 413-14.
255. McFall, No. 78-17711, slip op. at 2, quoted in Comment, supra note 249, at 413.
256. E.g., Sidwell v. McVay, 282 P.2d 756 (Okla. 1955) (strangers under no duty to pre-
vent minor from hammering a pipe containing explosives).
257. See Regan, supra note 231, at 1589.
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moral status, it should lay less claim to the aid of others than live-born
persons.
Furthermore, compelled treatment cannot be independently justified
on the ground that there is an overriding state or public interest in pro-
tecting the fetus from harm. There is a "public interest" in protecting
every person in need of aid and preserving his life that is "precisely
analogous to the public interest in saving the fetus, ' 258 yet we do not
force other potential Samaritans to render aid. It would be utterly anom-
alous to rely on the state or public interest to preserve the fetus' life in the
situation of a woman refusing medical treatment and yet ignore it in
other situations.
Furthermore, compelling pregnant women to undergo medical
treatment sets an unsavory precedent for further invasions of a woman's
privacy and bodily integrity, the same problem faced by the court in Mc-
Fall.259 Robertson has observed that if the result in Jefferson 260 is cor-
rect, "then far-reaching intrusions on the mother's body and freedom of
action for the benefit of the unborn child may legitimately follow."'26 1
Such intrusions could include court orders prohibiting pregnant women
from using alcohol, cigarettes, or other possibly harmful substances, for-
bidding them from continuing to work because of the presence of fetal
toxins in the workplace, forcing them to take drugs or accept intrauterine
blood transfusions, requiring pregnant anorexic teenagers to be force-fed,
forcing women to undergo prenatal screening and diagnostic procedures
such as amniocentesis, sonography, or fetoscopy, or mandating that wo-
men submit to in utero or extra-uterine surgery for the fetus. Robertson
and others262 seem little troubled by the prospect of such intrusions:
"Compulsory amniocentesis, in utero surgery, or cesarean section, while
more invasive, still have support in other precedents. '263 The prospect of
courts literally managing the lives of pregnant women and extensively
258. Id. at 1607.
259. See supra notes 249-54 & accompanying text.
260. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981);
see supra note 228.
261. Robertson, supra note 7, at 307.
262. E.g., Shaw, Conditional Prospective Rights of the Fetus, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 63, 98-116
(1984).
263. Robertson, supra note 7, at 360. Robertson apparently believes that such interven-
tions are justified under Roe v. Wade.
The state is compelling significant bodily intrusions to protect a patient who is not
yet fully a legal person and about whose moral worth a fierce controversy swirls. Yet
the fetal status of the beneficiary of the intrusion does not mean that a bodily inva-
sion is coerced for insubstantial or morally illegitimate reasons. If the fetus is near-
term, or even post-viability, its status is close enough to personhood that overriding
claims of bodily integrity is within the state's discretion under Roe v. Wade. If the
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intruding into their daily activities is frightening and antithetical to the
fundamental role that freedom of action plays in our society. Moreover,
enforcement of such orders would be difficult, entangling the judiciary in
women's private lives.
Finally, the state lacks an interest in fetal life sufficient to overcome
a woman's rights of privacy and bodily integrity, and further lacks any
other interest sufficient to justify compelling a pregnant woman to un-
dergo treatment. In Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 264 the court reviewed the cases regarding refusal of treatment
and identified four countervailing state interests that could outweigh an
individual's rights of privacy and bodily integrity when refusing treat-
ment: first, the preservation of life; second, the protection of innocent
third parties; third, the prevention of suicide; and fourth, maintaining the
ethical integrity of the medical profession. 265 When examined closely, it
is apparent that none of these interests justifies the compelled treatment
of pregnant women. In addition, the state's legitimate interest in
preventing parents from refusing medical treatment for their live-born
children does not justify compelling mothers to undergo treatment for
their fetuses.
The state's interest in preserving life commonly is thought to be the
most significant of the four potential state interests.266 It is questionable
whether the state has anything but an abstract interest in preserving the
life of a particular individual who has decided to refuse treatment.267
Such a general interest always should give way to a competent patient's
far stronger interests in self-determination, bodily integrity, and privacy.
mother has already foregone her right not to procreate by not aborting, then she no
longer has a right to produce a dead or unhealthy baby.
Id. As discussed earlier, see supra notes 176-198 & accompanying text, Roe v. Wade does not
permit the state to place the fetus' interests above those of the mother after the fetus becomes
viable. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). Moreover, no woman "waives" her right to
privacy and bodily integrity by not aborting the fetus prior to its becoming viable. Roe v.
Wade permits her to have an abortion after viability if necessary to protect her life or health.
Id. at 163-64.
264. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
265. Id. at 741, 370 N.E.2d at 425. Other courts have accepted this listing of the relevant
state interests without further analysis of their origins or justification. See, e.g., Bartling v.
Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984).
266. See, e.g., In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 634, 405 N.E.2d 115, 119 (1980); Saikewicz,
373 Mass. at 741, 370 N.E.2d at 425; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO
FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 32 (1983).
267. Cantor & Quinlan, Privacy and the Handling of Incompetent Dying Patients, 30
RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 249-50 (1977); see Annas, In re Quinlan: Legal Comfort for Doctors,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1976, at 29.
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If the state's general interest does not give way to the competent patient's
far stronger interests, the patient's right to refuse treatment would be
eviscerated, and the state would be put into the anomalous situation of
protecting a person who had competently decided not to protect himself.
Existing case law supports a competent adult's right to refuse medical
treatment.2 6
8
The state's interest in the protection of innocent third parties, par-
ticularly minor children, "from the emotional and financial damage
which may occur as a result of the decision of a competent adult to refuse
life-saving or life-prolonging treatment" 269 is highly questionable both in
origin and as a matter of intelligent public policy. The leading case for
the existence and significance of this state interest is Application of the
President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc. 270 In Georgetown, a
twenty-five-year-old married mother of a seven-month-old baby was
brought to the hospital by her husband after she had lost two-thirds of
her blood supply from a ruptured ulcer. The woman and her husband
were Jehovah's Witnesses, a religion that prohibits its members from re-
ceiving blood transfusions. Judge Wright found the woman "was not in
a mental condition to make a decision" and signed an order permitting
the hospital to administer the blood.271
Although the patient's incompetency was a sufficient reason to au-
thorize the transfusion, Judge Wright proposed other grounds to justify
his action:
The state, as parens patriae, will not allow a parent to abandon a child,
and so it should not allow this most ultimate of voluntary abandon-
ments. The patient had a responsibility to the community to care for
her infant. Thus the people had an interest in preserving the life of this
mother.272
This assertion lacked any precedential foundation. Its primary weakness
is its failure to recognize the mother's strong constitutional and common-
law rights to privacy, bodily integrity, self-determination, and religious
freedom. The state's interest in preventing the death of the mother of a
268. Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Bartling v. Superior
Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984); In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C.
1972); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla.
1980); Zant v. Prevatte, 248 Ga. 832, 286 S.E.2d 715 (1982); In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d
361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965); Mercy Hosp. v. Jackson, 62 Md. App. 409, 489 A.2d 1130, cert.
granted, 304 Md. 47, 497 A.2d 484 (1985); Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376
N.E.2d 1232 (1978); In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (Morris County
Ct. 1978); In re Melideo, 88 Misc. 2d 974, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).
269. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 742, 370 N.E.2d at 426.
270. 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
271. Id. at 1007.
272. Id. at 1008. The court cited no authority to support these assertions.
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minor child, on the other hand, is quite attenuated. Although the pa-
tient's child might suffer financial or emotional loss as a result of the
patient's death, it is difficult to see why the state's interest in preventing
this harm is sufficiently strong to force a competent adult to accept life
on terms she finds unacceptable. Moreover, it is unclear why this pur-
ported interest of the state rises to a level of significance that could out-
weigh the constitutional rights of the patient.
While it is undesirable for a child to lose its mother for any reason,
it is arguably less desirable to force competent adults to relinquish con-
trol over their lives and bodies and to undergo treatment they find repug-
nant. Furthermore, in the Georgetown case itself, no evidence indicated
that the infant would be totally "abandoned" at the death of her mother,
particularly because the child's father was alive.273 In the unlikely case
that a patient's refusal of treatment would directly threaten the lives or
health of others (for example, Typhoid Mary refuses treatment that
would render her non-infectious), a superior state interest in the protec-
tion of innocent third parties makes sense. Outside this narrow situation,
however, the state's interest in protecting innocent third parties is ex-
ceedingly weak and amorphous when compared to the competent adult
patient's interests in refusing treatment.
Further, the state's arguable interest in the protection of innocent
third parties would only apply to a pregnant woman if she already had
children or if the fetus itself were considered an "innocent third party."
The reasons that a fetus should not be considered a separate person
whose interests may outweigh those of a pregnant woman were discussed
above.274 Even if a pregnant mother of a minor child could potentially
die from her refusal of treatment, neither Judge Wright's novel "aban-
donment" theory in Georgetown nor that of any other case provides a
persuasive reason why the mother's rights and interests should be
subordinated to the state's interest in preventing abandonment of the
child.275
Like its interest in the preservation of life, the state's interest in the
273. See In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972), in which the patient had provided for
the financial welfare of his two minor children.
274. See supra notes 218-26 & accompanying text.
275. In In re Application of Winthrop Univ. Hosp., 128 Misc. 2d 804, 490 N.Y.S.2d 996
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985), the court ordered a competent adult woman who was the mother of two
infants to receive blood transfusions if, during surgery to remove kidney stones, they were
necessary to preserve her life. The patient had refused the transfusions on religious grounds.
While noting that "[c]ourts are generally without power to order compulsory medical treat-
ment over a competent adult patient's objection," it nonetheless granted the order, citing Ge-
orgetown as authority for the proposition that the state may compel treatment to prevent a
mother from "abandoning" her children. Id. at 804-05, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 996-97. For the
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prevention of suicide has never sufficed to force a competent patient to
accept treatment.276 According to Saikewicz, the state's interest is really
in the "prevention of irrational self-destruction." This interest is not im-
plicated in a competent adult's refusal of treatment because such an act
does not constitute suicide.277 It is not suicide when "the patient may
not have the specific intent to die, and .... even if he did, to the extent
that the cause of death was from natural causes the patient did not set
the death producing agent in motion with the intent of causing his own
death. ' 278 If a pregnant woman knows what she is doing,279 the state's
interest in preventing suicide should not prevent her wishes from being
respected.
The fourth state interest, in maintaining the ethical integrity of the
medical profession, is the oddest and least intelligible of the lot. Ge-
orgetown is often cited as the first case to explicate this interest, 280 but the
case did not mention this state interest. The court did note it was uncer-
tain whether the patient had "authority" to put the hospital and physi-
cians at risk of civil or criminal liability if they should let her die as a
result of her refusal. 281 Another case commonly cited for this same prop-
osition alludes to the patient subjecting the practitioners to a risk of lia-
bility, but focuses on the asserted right of a hospital and health care
practitioners to impose treatment on a patient as they see fit.
282
This supposed interest of the state should not outweigh a competent
reasons discussed earlier, see supra notes 268-73 & accompanying text, this is an insufficient
justification for compelled treatment of competent adults.
276. No reported case has held that a competent patient must undergo medical treatment
he has refused in order to vindicate the state's interest in the prevention of suicide.
277. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 743 n. 11, 370 N.E.2d at 426 n. 11.
278. Id. Other cases have recognized a distinction between the self-infliction of deadly
harm and a choice against accepting medical treatment. See. e.g., Bartling v. Superior Court,
163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 196, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 226 (1984).
279. A competent adult is, by definition, someone who is able to demonstrate that he un-
derstands the nature and consequences of his actions, and thus is not so mentally disordered as
to be out of touch with his particular situation. See supra note 1. An adult can be depressed or
confused to some extent, yet remain competent to refuse treatment. Bartling v. Superior
Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 193, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 223-24 (1984); Lane v. Candura, 6
Mass. App. Ct. 377, 383-84, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1235-36 (1979). On the other hand, an adult
can be so out of touch with her medical condition and equivocal about accepting the likely
fatal consequences of a refusal of treatment that she is incompetent to make a binding decision.
Department of Human Servs. v. Northern, 563 S.W.2d 197, 207 (Tenn. Ct. App.), appeal
dismissed as moot, 436 U.S. 923 (1978).
280. E.g., Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 743, 370 N.E.2d at 426.
281. Georgetown, 331 F.2d at 1009.
282. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 583, 279 A.2d 670, 673
(1971) ("When the hospital and staff are thus involuntary hosts and their interests are pitted
against the belief of the patient, we think it reasonable to resolve the problem by permitting the
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adult's right to refuse treatment. First, if the medical profession could
obtain judicial assistance because it found the physician's acquiescence in
the patient's refusal of treatment to be "unethical," the patient's constitu-
tional and common-law rights would be rendered meaningless. "[I]f the
right of the patient to self-determination as to his own medical treatment
is to have any meaning at all, it must be paramount to the interests of the
patient's hospital and doctors. ' 283 Second, physicians and hospitals have
nothing to fear legally if they respect the wishes of a competent adult
who refuses treatment.28 4 Thus, there is no benefit to the medical profes-
sion from the state's protection but there is a high cost to the patient.
Finally, it is entirely unclear why the state should have an interest in
maintaining the ethics of the medical profession that is sufficiently com-
pelling to overcome the strong constitutional and common-law rights of
a competent adult. A patient refusing treatment is not asking the physi-
cian to perform an affirmative act that is harmful and therefore "unethi-
cal." Rather, the patient is asking to be left alone.
hospital and its staff to pursue their functions [of preserving life] according to their profes-
sional standards.").
In Crouse-Irving Memorial Hosp. v. Paddock, 127 Misc. 2d 101, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1985), the court ordered that a competent adult woman receive blood transfusions, if
necessary, after undergoing a Cesarean section, on the ground that her religiously motivated
refusal to accept the transfusion put the hospital and her doctors in "an untenable position."
Id. at 104, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 445. The court cited Georgetown for the proposition that her
providers faced civil and criminal liability for respecting her refusal and suggested that health
care providers have the right to treat a patient as they see fit. Id. at 103-04, 485 N.Y.S.2d at
445-46. For the reasons set forth earlier in this Article, neither of these arguments is persua-
sive. Again, as in In re Application of Jamaica Hosp., 128 Misc. 2d 1006, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985), and In re Application of Winthrop Univ. Hosp., 128 Misc. 2d 804, 490
N.Y.S.2d 996 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985), the patient was not represented by counsel and no refer-
ence was made to the patient's constitutional right of privacy. See supra notes 225, 275.
283. Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225
(1984); accord Mercy Hosp. v. Jackson, 62 Md. App. 409, 489 A.2d 1130 (hospital's religious
values secondary to patient's choice to refuse treatment), cert. granted, 304 Md. 47, 497 A.2d
484 (1985); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 352-53, 486 A.2d 1209, 1225 (1985) ("Indeed, if the
patient's right to informed consent is to have any meaning at all, it must be accorded respect
even when it conflicts with the advice of the doctor or the values of the medical profession as a
whole.").
284. The New York Court of Appeals has noted that a state
which imposes civil liability on a doctor if he violates the patient's right [to determine
the course of his own medical treatment] cannot also hold him criminally responsible
if he respects that right. Thus a doctor cannot be held to have violated his legal or
professional responsibilities when he honors the right of a competent adult patient to
decline medical treatment.
In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 377, 420 N.E.2d 64, 71, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 273 (footnote omit-
ted), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981). Similarly, a California court of appeal has held that a
physician or hospital "could not have been criminally or civilly liable" for honoring a compe-
tent patient's refusal of treatment. Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 199, 209
Cal. Rptr. 220, 226 (1984).
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The state's interest in protecting the lives and health of live-born
children also does not justify the compelled treatment of pregnant wo-
men. Parents do not have the legal right to refuse medical treatment for
their live-born children in all situations.28 5 It does not logically follow,
as some have insisted,2 86 that a mother would also lack the legal author-
ity to refuse treatment beneficial to her fetus. Treatment of a live-born
child does not implicate the mother's rights to privacy and bodily integ-
rity; treatment of a fetus inevitably does. Nonconsensual invasion of the
mother's body is a much more fundamental and direct assault on her
person than defying her will. Furthermore, a live-born child is
unarguably a separate and independent being from its mother. Its legal
and moral status as a person is recognized almost uniformly. 28 7 The fe-
tus does not now receive, and never has received, such recognition.2 88
Conclusion
Fortunately, pregnant women only rarely refuse medical treatment
that promises to benefit their fetuses and perhaps themselves as well.
Thus, the ensuing conflict between the mother and her fetus when the
mother refuses medical treatment will erupt only rarely. When mothers
do refuse such treatment, the most appropriate response of physicians,
nurses, and hospitals is to honor their wishes. Correspondingly, judges
also should honor a mother's refusal and refrain from issuing orders that
would compel her to receive treatment that she has decided, for her own
reasons, to forego.
Physicians and judges may, on rare occasions, confront a situation
in which a mother will refuse a simple, common form of medical treat-
ment, such as a blood transfusion or an innocuous drug, that causes at
most an insignificant and minimal invasion. They will, undoubtedly, be
deeply troubled by the prospect of allowing the mother to make what
would be considered the "wrong" choice by almost everyone, including
the authors of this Article. Nevertheless, it is best to let the mother's
wishes prevail. If physicians and judges intervene in a situation involving
minimal intrusion and risk, there is no reason in principle why they could
285. Seee.g., In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 949 (1980) (setting forth sound legal standards for evaluating parental refusals of
treatment, but reaching a questionable result on the facts). See Myers, supra note 4, at 212
n.44 for a variety of articles discussing this most difficult issue.
286. Myers, supra note 4, at 32-52.
287. The philosopher Michael Tooley, in a now famous article, has argued that infanticide
may be justified on the same grounds as abortion. Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, 2 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 37 (1972).
288. See supra notes 101-65 & accompanying text.
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not intervene when the mother would be at more risk of harm, when the
treatment was more invasive, or when her reasons for refusing might
seem less "acceptable." It is impossible to meaningfully distinguish an
"acceptable" level of risk of physical harm from the "unacceptable," a
"minor" unobjectionable invasion of the mother's body from a "major"
objectionable invasion, or a "good" or "rational" reason for refusing the
treatment from a "bad" or "irrational" reason.2 89 It is far better simply
to avoid compelling pregnant women to live as seems good to a particular
physician, judge, or even to the rest of us than to force them to sacrifice
their wills and their bodies on the altar of someone else's notion of the
good. 29
0
Admittedly, this course of action may result in the birth of children
who will suffer from an injury or disease that might have been avoided
had their mothers chosen differently. It may also result in the death of
fetuses who otherwise might have lived.
This will be tragic, but it is likely to be rare. It is the price society pays
for protecting the rights of all competent adults, and preventing forci-
ble, physical violations of women by coercive obstetricians and judges.
The choice between fetal health and maternal liberty is laced with
moral and ethical dilemmas. The force of law will not make them go
away.291
The price to fetuses and to society of honoring maternal refusals of treat-
ment may seem high, but contrary policy would rob us of much more
and leave us far poorer as human beings.
289. The dissent in United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977), mirrors this concern. After noting that the majority opin-
ion gave no indication as to how to distinguish "minor" and "major" bodily intrusions, the
dissent wisely noted:
In sum, [the majority opinion allowing minor surgery] leaves to ad hoe determina-
tion, simply on the elastic and imprecise scale of reasonableness, the extent to which
the arm of government may reach inside the human body. That, I fear, starts us
down a slippery slope-on which there can be no stopping.
Id. at 324 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
290. One commentator has noted:
One must realize that the purchase price of a government which is party to nopartic-
ular religious or metaphysical view point, and therefore able to embrace peaceably
communities with widely divergent views of how citizens should live their private
lives, requires foregoing the temptation to impose by state force one's own view of
proper private morality. A peaceable pluralist society can be achieved only at the
price of toleration. One will need to be content with converting others by witness
rather than constraining conformity through force.
Engelhardt, supra note 227, at xix (emphasis in original).
291. Annas, supra note 4, at 45.
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